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Tim Quigley* Specific and General
Nonsense?
I. Introduction
In a previous article,1 I dealt with the argument that the present law on
the intoxication defence was well-founded on legal authority and
concluded that it was not. I then suggested that those wishing to uphold
the present law as represented by Leary v. The Queen2 and D.PP v.
Majewski3 would have to find support in other arguments. The purpose
of this article is therefore to examine those arguments to see whether they
provide sufficient ground for the current state of the law in Canada and
England. In particular, the specific-general intent dichotomy will be
examined in this light.
The discussion will lead to the conclusion that the present law is
indefensible and should be changed in favour of a consistent, principled
approach to mens rea. Despite problems that may arise in particular
situations, the subjective approach is the one that best meets the criteria
of principle, fairness to the accused, and consistency, and the one that is
the simplest to apply in practice.
I do not, however, expect that that statement will go unchallenged.
There will be those who say that blind adherence to subjectivism leads to
grave difficulties in theory and even graver difficulties in practice. They
argue that the legitimate concerns of society are not met by allowing self-
induced incapacity or lack of intent as an excusing condition in every
situation. It can be seen that these objections are primarily founded on the
twin heads of "logic" and policy.
I propose therefore to meet these criticisms. First, however, let me
enumerate the bases upon which justification of the present distinction
between specific and general intent is usually sought. This is not to
neglect those other contentious items to do with the intoxication defence.
For instance, it is a plausible argument that intoxication contributing to
a mistake of fact might be a defence to a general intent offence while
simple intoxication would not However, such concerns as recklessness,
*Assistant Professor, College of Law, University of Saskatchewan.
1. See: Quigley, "A Shorn Beard" (1987), 10 DaL L.J No. 3,167.
2. Leary v. The Queen, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 29.
3. D.PP v. Majewski, [1976] 2 All E.R. 142 (H.L.).
4. That argument is based on dicta in P,. v. George, [1960] S.C.R. 871, at 890 and in Reilly
v. The Queen (1984), 42 C. R. (3d) 154, at 162-63. (S.C.C.), on the fact that intoxication as
a cause of mistake was not ruled out in Pappajohn v. the Queen (1980), 52 C.C.C. (2d) 481
(S.C.C.), and on R. v. Cogan and Leak, [1975] 2 All E.R. 1059. (C.A.). A. J. Ashworth,
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mistake, capacity as opposed to intent in fact, and prior fault through
culpable cognitive impairment have their underpinnings, either directly
or indirectly, in the partition into different kinds of intent. Thus, I hope
to show that an undifferentiated approach to the mental element of crime
will lead to much greater clarity and simplicity in the consideration of
these other criminal concepts.
But back to specific and general intent. Enthusiasts of these species
make two general arguments in their favour. The first is simply that the
distinction is "logical" though the cry of logic has several different chords.
The second is that, even if the division into specific and general intents
isn't strictly "logical", it need not be because the dictates of public policy
make it necessary. My thesis, of course, is that the distinction is neither
"logical" nor good policy.
It will have been noticed that "logic" has up to now been inserted
within quotation marks. It is time for a disclaimer but one with which
most proponents of the specific and general intent dichotomy would
agree. The meaning accorded "logic" in this context is simply that of
"making sense". Whenever the term is used in this article, it is meant as
a rough synonym for "making sense", that is, in the same manner as
"logic" is rather loosely used in ordinary conversation. It thus denotes
consistency and a lack of patent contradictions but with no claim to
compliance with the principles of formal logic.
That logical is meant in this sense is indicated by the cases, particularly
Majewski, which have dealt with arguments against the "logic" of the
present intoxication rules. They have not made any reference at all to
what the requirements of strict logic might be. In other words, there has
been no indication that the courts intended to use the term in the way that
philosophers do. Moreover, critics and proponents alike have shunned
any move into a narrow philosophical test.
As the term "logic" will be used here, it will generally take two forms.
The first is to query whether there exist any meaningful criteria by which
to distinguish specific from general intent. If such criteria are found, that
is not the end of the discussion. There is then the further question of
"Reason, Logic, and Criminal Liability" (1975), 91 LQ.R. 102, at 118, though relying on
different authorities, has come to the same conclusion. The potential anomaly may have been
removed by the recent decision in R. v. Moreau (1986), 51 C.R. (3d) 209 (Ont. C. A. ) where
Martin, J. A., speaking for a unanimous Court held that for policy reasons, a mistake induced
by intoxication could not provide a defence to a general intent offence unless the same accused
would have made the same mistake if sober. Obviously, we must await some pronouncement
from the Supreme Court of Canada. Hopefully, they will reconsider the entire question of
specific and general intent in relation to both intoxication and mistake.
5. Alan Dashwood, "Logic and the Lords in Majewski", [1977] Cim L. Rev. 532, at 591, is
perhaps the only commentator to have strayed into this area at all and, even then, only to a
minor degree.
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whether there are sufficient reasons to sustain the distinction. I will
attempt to answer both questions. Note, however, that a negative answer
to the first reduces the second to insignificance.
For the sake of the following discussion, I will assume that the general-
specific intent distinction applies consistently to all facets of intoxication,
including automatous behavior, a lack of capacity to form intent or a lack
of actual intent, and for mistakes. Thus, I am ignoring, for the time being,
the suggestion made previously that mistakes might be treated somewhat
differently. I will, however, allude to that point near the end of the article.
There are several strands to the proposition that specific and general
intent are logical beasts. Some of these are to be found in the various
judgments in Majewski. The judgments in Majewski are somewhat
confusing in their attempt to distinguish the two kinds of intent. In short,
however, a summary of the arguments in Majewski that the distinction
rests on logical grounds is as follows:
1. The mens rea for specific intent offences extends beyond the actus
reus and intoxication can negative that additional mental element;
the mens rea for basic intent (or, in Canada, general intent) offences
does not extend beyond the actus reus and cannot be negatived by
intoxication. The test is actually more complicated than this as later
discussion will show. For convenience, this test will be known as
The Basic Intent Test.
2. Specific intent involves a purposive element which can be negatived
by intoxication; basic intent does not have such a purposive element.
This test will be known as The Purposive Test.
3. Specific intent offences have intention but not recklessness as a
mental element and permit intoxication to negative intention; self-
induced intoxication amounts to recklessness which is sufficient to
constitute the mens rea for basic intent offences, thereby preventing
intoxication as a defence. This test will be known as The
Recklessness Test.
The judgments in Majewski contain various offshoots of those three
arguments. Indeed, while most commentators6 have agreed that those
three tests are embodied in the case, others have opined that some
6. See e.g.: Alan D. Gold, "An Untrimmed 'Beard' "The Law of Intoxication as a Defence
to a Criminal Charge ' (1976), 19 Crim LQ. 34; Gerald Orchard, "Drunkenness as a
'Defence' to 'Crime", [1977] Crim. U. 59, at 132; Paul B. Schabas, "Intoxication and
Culpability: Towards an offence of Criminal Intoxication" (1984), 42 UT Fac. L Rev. 147;
John Sellers, "Mens Rea and the Judicial Approach to 'Bad Excuses' in the Criminal Law"
(1978), 41 Mod L Rev. 244; J. C. Smith, "Commentary", [1976] Cim LR. 374; G. R.
Walker, "Intoxication at the Crossroads", [1977] N.Z.L.J 401; Glanville Williams,
"Intoxication aud Specific Intent" (1976), 126 N.LJ. 658.
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additional approaches are contained in it or are, at least, available in
support of the distinction.
7
At the outset, I will discuss these three approaches. Later, however, I
will also deal with some of the broader approaches suggested in the legal
literature. In that portion of the article, there will be an examination of
the differing schools of mens rea theory along with the doctrine of prior
fault in getting into an incapacitated condition.
On the policy front, the stance usually taken by those advocating the
present position is that the public requires some protection from
intoxicated offenders. That simple statement, however, can be broken
down into several distinct propositions.
One is an argument for deterrence of such conduct; deterrence then
takes its two forms: general and individual (or specific). The suggestion
is that, by restricting the intoxication defence, the public and individuals
are deterred either from committing general intent offences for which the
defence is not available or that they are deterred from getting themselves
into an incapacitated condition during which they might commit such an
offence. Both propositions will be examined.
On the other hand, protection of the public can simply refer to the
danger presented by certain types of intoxicated conduct and the need to
thwart such conduct. This approach implies that deterrence of either type
is not an important consideration when placed alongside the necessity to
punish such activity in a retributive way.
Yet another approach might be seen as vaguely political. The function
of the criminal law is "the establishment and maintenance of order",8
within the ambit of which might be subsumed the preservation of
individual liberty and protection of such liberty from personal violence
It obviously overlaps with concern over protection of the public but also
includes the political goal of preserving society in its present form. This
approach might therefore be seen as an attempt to use the power of the
state to maintain the order necessary to the economic, social and political
system. Thus, limitations placed upon the intoxication defence assist in
the maintenance of the established order.
7. For example, N. L. A. Barlow, "Drug Intoxication and the Principle of Capacilas
Rationalis' (1984), 100 L.Q.R. 639, focuses on the intoxication equals recklessness test. Alan
Dashwood, supra, note 5, includes, along with the three tests, a more general mens rea
approach. John E. Stannard, "The Demise of Drunkenness" (1982), 2LS. 291, seesMajewski
as typifying a resurrection of the older view of mens rea that involves morial blameworthiness
in contradistinction to the particularized view now commonly held. On the other hand, Eric
Colvin, "A Theory of the Intoxication Defence" (1981), 59 Can. Bar Rev. 750, posits that
there is an implicit logic to the present law on the basis that offences carrying an ulterior intent
or having a fixed penalty are specific intent offences, thus allowing the intoxication defence.
8. Majewski, supra, note 3, at 168.
9. Id., at 158.
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In any case, my aim will not necessarily be to dispute these stated
purposes of the criminal law (though I do quarrel with some of them)
but, instead, to question whether the existing intoxication rules achieve or
are even capable of achieving those purposes.
At the end, I will draw conclusions about the persuasiveness of the
various arguments and suggest the direction the criminal law ought to
take. This will entail a plea for subjectivism but with concessions, where
appropriate, to the legitimate problems that arise from a thoroughly
subjective approach to mens rea.
There is one other point to be considered. It could be argued that all
of the tests have been shown by the decision in Swietlinski v. The
Queen'0 to be misconceived. In that case, it was held that where
intoxication was in issue in a constructive murder situation and the
underlying offence was one of general intent, nonetheless the Crown was
required to prove the requisite intent for that underlying general intent
offence. Intoxication could be taken into account on this question. As
Colvin put it:
Swietlinski sounds the death-knell for the idea that the state of mind
required to be proved for an offence of specific intent is different in kind
from that required for an offence of general intent. The proposition is
clearly unsustainable if the same intent can be characterized as specific or
general depending on the crime charged.'
Indeed, the discussion following will show that none of the tests makes
sense for murder. Murder, perhaps because of its fixed penalty and/or its
special stigma, must be considered an exceptional offence. Having said
that, Swietlinski nonetheless weakens the argument that any of the tests
is an accurate and meaningful way of distinguishing the two types of
intent. Murder aside for the moment, let us look at the arguments for and
against the various tests.
II. The Tests in Majewski, Leary and George'
2
In this section, I will examine the tests that commentators have gleaned
from Majewski in order to see whether logic prevails in this area of the
criminal law. I concede at the outset that whether or not the present law
makes sense does not determine the further question of whether it is
justifiable that the intoxication defence be restricted in some way.
Nonetheless, if the tests laid down in Majewski (and seemingly endorsed
in Leary) fall before the complaint of being inconsistent with logic, it is
a powerful criticism of the current state of the law.
10. Swietlinskiv. The Queen (1980), 55 C.C.C. (2d) 481. (S.C.C.).
11. Colvin, supra, note 7, at 766.
12. Supra, notes 2, 3, and 4.
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Moreover, if no intelligible criteria exist for determining in which
category an offence is to be placed, it is a telling blow to the way the
intoxication defence is currently restricted in law. It might then be the
case that restrictions on the defence ought to take some other form.
Indeed, I should add that a distinction must be drawn between the logic
of limiting the defence and the logic of how that should be done. It should
be apparent that having limitations may be very sensible even though the
present method of accomplishing the restriction may make little sense
at all.
1. The Basic Intent Test
13
To recapitulate, this test was espoused in Majewski by Lord Elwyn-
Jones, L.C. and Lord Simon.' 4 The same test was also referred to, though
briefly, by the Court of Appeal' 5 in Majewski and later in the dissent in
R. v. Caldwell' 6 One initial difficulty with the way the test was advanced
in the House of Lords in Majewski is that Lords Elwyn-Jones and Simon
gave quite different tests!
That statement warrants some amplification. Lord Elwyn-Jones, in
fact, quoted Lord Simon's definition of basic intent in D.PP v. Morgan.'
7
Lord Simon's Morgan definition distinguished basic from specific intent
by limiting the mens rea of the former so as not to extend it beyond the
act and its consequence as defined in the actus reus. Presumably, since it
was intended that there be a distinction between the two types of intent,
the mens rea for specific intent must extend beyond the actus reus.
Unfortunately, Lord Elwyn-Jones did not see fit to define specific intent
so we are left to wonder.
In Morgan, however, Lord Simon contrasted basic intent with ulterior
intent.' 8 The latter was an intent that did extend beyond the actus reus.'9
Perhaps, then, Lord Elwyn-Jones meant to equate specific intent with
ulterior intent. At least that would have been a consistent approach.
But matters become confused by the same Lord Simon in his judgment
in Majewski. First, he concurred with Lord Elwyn-Jones, 20 then added
13. So named by, inter alia, Gold, supra, note 6 and Smith, supra, note 6.
14. Lords Kilbrandon and Diplock concurred with Lord Elwyn-Jones. So did Lord Simon
but, by adding to the confusing judgment of Lord Elwyn-Jones, he made the entire case even
more perplexing.
15. R. v. Majewski, [1975l 3 All E.R. 296, at 302,306. (C.A.).
16. R v. Caldwell, [1981] 1 All E.R. 961, at 968-73. (H.L.).
17. D.PP v. Morgan, [1975] 2 All E.R. 347, at 363-64, (H.L.), cited in Majewski, supra, note
3, at 147.
18. Id., at 364.
19. Id.
20. Majewski, supra, note 3, at 152.
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what he called "marginal comment". 2' This might indicate that he agreed
with Lord Elwyn-Jones (and himself) that basic intent and specific intent
were opposites.
Later on, however, he explicitly disagreed with that approach:
But I would not wish it to be thought that I consider "ulterior intent" as
I defined it in Morgan as interchangeable with "specific intent"
... "Ulterior intent" which I can here summarily describe as a state of
mind contemplating consequences beyond those defined in the actus reus,
is merely one type of 'specific intent".. 22
[emphasis mine]
He obviously realized that not all offences which had hitherto been
categorized as specific intent offences carried with them an ulterior intent,
for he continued by saying:
"Ulterior intent" does not accurately describe the state of mind in the
crime of doing an act likely to assist the enemy with intent to assist the
enemy (R. v. Steane) or causing grievous bodily harm with intent to do
some grievous bodily harm (Offences against the Person Act 1861, s. 18,
as amended by the Criminal Law Act 1967) or even murder. None of
these requires by its definition contemplation of consequences extending
beyond the actus reus.23
Thus, we are left in this position: Lord Simon in Morgan posited basic
intent as a contrast to ulterior intent; Lord Elwyn-Jones in Majewski
adopted this view and, in doing so, implicitly equated ulterior intent with
specific intent; Lord Simon agreed with Lord Elwyn-Jones and his own
views in Morgan and, at the same time, disagreed with the proposition
that ulterior intent and specific intent are the same!
Obviously this is not a satisfactory state of affairs. It is, indeed, a
powerful criticism of the basic intent theory that two of its major
proponents cannot agree upon the definitions of the terms. Moreover, if
not all specific intent offences are ulterior intent offences, by what criteria
can we discern those specific intent offences which are not of ulterior
intent? How do we differentiate that category of specific intent offences
from basic intent offences?
Because of the confusion noted above, it is not possible to be sure just
what is meant by basic intent. Lord Simon may, in fact, be suggesting a
new type of basic intent for the purposes of the intoxication rules. On the
other hand, he may merely have failed to see the implications of both
agreeing and disagreeing with Lord Elwyn-Jones.
21. Id.
22. Id., at 153-54.
23. Id., at 154.
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If ulterior intent and specific intent are equated, then the basic intent
theory becomes very like that proposed by Colvin.24 In contrast, if Lord
Simon meant any variation in his definition of basic intent, as set out in
Morgan, then obviously his basic intent for intoxication purposes is not
the same as Colvin's. Unfortunately, he did not specify any difference
and, indeed, at one point in Majewski,5 again adopted the basic intent
definition he had suggested in Morgan.
The result is that, notwithstanding the apparent contradictions, it must
be taken that basic intent means mens rea which does not extend past the
actus reus. On that assumption, it is useful at this point to bring in the
Colvin theory. Professor Colvin has presented a novel theory concerning
the intoxication defence.26 He does not claim that the existing law is
correct but maintains that there is, in the categorization of offences, "a
largely implicit and unrecognized logic." 27 Under his theory, the terms
"specific" and "general" intent have no content but are mere guidelines
indicating when the intoxication defence is available. There are then three
main branches to the theory which indicate when the defence is allowed:
1. The defence is available for any charge having an ulterior intent.
28
2. The defence is available for any offence having a fixed penalty even
if it does not carry with it the requirement of an ulterior intent.29
3. The defence will be permitted when the entire section of the statute
"may be characterized as creating an offence of specific intent
because of the possibility that the particular charge may allege
ulterior intent.
30
Let me deal with the last two categories rather quickly. Colvin used the
last proposition to answer why all offences under section 22831 of the
Criminal Code and why causing grievous bodily harm with intent to
cause grievous bodily harm32 have been designated as specific intent
offences. In the case of the section 228 offences, causing bodily harm with
24. Colvin, supra, note 7. One obvious difference is that Colvin accepts that murder is a
specific intent offence for a reason different from any of the three Majewski tests, namely, that
it has a fixed penalty.
25. Majewski supra, note 3, at 154.
26. Colvin, supra, note 7.
27. Id., at 751.
28. Id., at 752. J. C. Smith and Brian Hogan, Criminal Law (5th ed. London: Butterworths,
1983) at 59, define ulterior intent as an intent ulterior to, that is, going beyond, the actus reus.
29. Id.
30. Id., at 762.
31. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 228 as it was at the time of the article, amended
by S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 125, s. 17 to delete "causes bodily harm in any way".
32. The OffencesAgainst the Person Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 100, s. 18 (U.K.).
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intent to wound is, in fact, an ulterior intent offence,33 meaning that the
third rule need not be used. As for the other offence, it is plausible that
judges have interpreted it as being one of specific intent because the intent
is clearly specified in the enactment and is strikingly similar to the "with
intent to" offences which otherwise are often of ulterior intent. It is
impossible, of course, to know why judges have decided that the offence
is a specific intent offence, hence, the Colvin proposition may indeed be
correct. In any case, the basic intent test provides no answer for this
offence.
However, under this criterion, because an assault under section
244(l)(b)34 of the Code (an attempt to apply force... causing the victim
to believe... that he has present ability to effect his purpose) requires an
ulterior intent, all assaults should be considered specific intent offences.
They have, in fact, been construed as general intent offences.35 It is
unlikely that the intoxication defence would be permitted for this
particular subsection even though it is an ulterior intent offence.36
In advancing the second proposition, Colvin pointed out that murder
does not usually require an ulterior intent.3 7 Thus, in its more common
forms of requiring an intent to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm
known to be likely to cause death,38 murder has been cited as an offence
not correctly categorized by the basic intent test.39 It thus makes sense to
see it as a special case. Whether this is wholly due to its fixed penalty is
a matter of conjecture; as I have previously attempted to show, 40 whether
the intoxication defence was accepted as a device to mitigate the
harshness of the law and/or because of increasing recognition of the
33. This is because "wound" has a particular legal meaning distinct from bodily harm. It
requires an actual breaking of the skin: R. v. Innes andBrotchie (1972), 7 C.C.C. (2d) 544, at
551. (B.C.C.A.)
34. Code, supra, note 31, s. 244(1)(b).
35. George, supra, note 4 held common assault, presumably as defined in the present s.
244(1)(a), to be a general intent offence. Majewski and many other cases also have held assault
to be a basic or general intent offence.
36. This is because of it being defined as an attempt which, according to the Colvin theory,
is always an ulterior intent offence: supra, note 7, at 761. At 762, note 64, Colvin answers this
by suggesting that, where "the accusation of ulterior intent" is exceptional, the defence may be
permitted for the exceptional form though excluded for other forms.
37. Id., at 764. He lists Code ss. 212(c), 213(a) and 213(d) as containing an element of ulterior
intent. S. 214(4) might also be an ulterior intent form of murder. By analogy with R. v. Shand
(1971), 3 C.C.C. (2d) 8 (Man. C.A.) (which dealt with now-repealed capital murder) it would
seemingly require knowledge on the part of the accused that the victim was a prison guard,
police officer, etc Doubt has now, however, been shed on Shand by R. v. Munro and Munro
(1983), 8 C.C.C. (3d) 260 (Ont. C.A.).
38. Id., s. 212(a)(i) and (ii).
39. Smith, supra, note 6, at 377.
40. Supra, note 1.
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mental element is a matter of controversy. Nonetheless, whatever the
reason, it seems right to consider murder exceptional. Thus, even if it
cannot correctly be categorized by the basic intent test, it is a specific
intent offence.
41
In fashioning his last two propositions, Colvin was obviously cognizant
that some amendment of the basic intent theory was required. Otherwise,
a number of offences could not be explained. The fact that exceptions are
required may weaken his claim that it is, after all, a theory.42 That, of
course, depends upon the definition accorded "theory", a topic with
which I am not concerned here.
Leaving that question aside, it is to be noticed that his first proposition
is the same as the basic intent theory advanced by Lord Elwyn-Jones. In
other words, basic intent and ulterior intent are opposites, the latter
requiring an intent going beyond the actus reus which can be negatived
by evidence of intoxication.
At an initial glance, that first proposition seems to provide a useful
guide. However, there are offences for which it does not provide the
correct answer. In addition to those perhaps now covered by Colvin's
second and third propositions, some of these are: (1) attempts; (2)
possession of stolen property; (3) joyriding; and (4) causing bodily harm
with intent to cause bodily harm. Some commentators have also
mentioned others to which I shall briefly allude further on in this section.
Attempts are a source of much confusion in this area. To begin with,
Colvin states that all attempts are ulterior intent, the further intention
being to complete the actus reus of the full offence.43 On that basis, the
intoxication defence ought to be permitted for all attempts. But there is
a substantial body of case law suggesting an attempt is to be categorized
in the same way as the completed offence.
One such offence is attempted rape which, in Canada, was seen as a
general intent offence.44 In Boucher,45 there were two issues at trial:
whether penetration had taken place and whether intoxication was a
defence to rape and/or attempted rape. Without considering whether an
41. Swiellinski, supra, note 10.
42. This is because, instead of some unifying logic, it has several components. It therefore is
somewhat akin to the "i" before "e" except after "c" rule, which, while explaining the spelling
of a great many words, does not explain the correct spelling of several others, such as "weight"
and "neighbour". Adding the rider "and for words rhyming with 'weight" still does not explain
"height", "foreign", or "science".
43. Colvin, supra, note 7, at 757, so states and, further, at 758, cites, at note 45, Smith, supra,
note 6, at 377, as stating that all ulterior intent offences are specific intent offences.
Examination reveals, however, that Smith did not so state explicitly.
44. R. v. Boucher, [1963] 2 C.C.C. 241. (B.C.C.A.). Rape and attempted rape are no longer
offences, having been replaced by sexual assault.
45. Id.
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attempt ought to be treated differently from the full offence, the British
Columbia Court of Appeal ruled out the intoxication defence. The case
was explicitly approved of by the majority in Leary,46 again without any
suggestion that attempts might be treated in a different way. Leary clearly
held rape to be a basic intent offence.
There are therefore competing "logics" at play here. The logic of the
basic intent test or the Colvin theory would suggest that, since attempts
are ulterior intent, the intoxication defence should be available. The
counter-argument is best illustrated by the Boucher situation. Where
there is an issue as to whether the offence was completed plus an issue of
whether the intoxication defence is to be allowed, how is a jury to be
charged? Should they be told that, if penetration is proven, to ignore
evidence of intoxication but, if there is a doubt with respect to
penetration, they are then to consider evidence of intoxication on the
question of whether the accused intended to commit rape? In Australia,
for instance, the anomaly of allowing the intoxication defence for
attempted rape but not for rape was explicitly disapproved in R. v.
Hornbuckle.47 The same argument could be applied to any other offence
where the full offence is of basic (general) intent. The person on the street
would not find this approach very "logical"! Nor, I imagine, would most
judges.
What little case law there is in the area suggests the opposite approach,
namely, that the attempt is of the same type of intent as the complete
offence. Boucher implicitly adopts this approach as does R. v. Pagee.
48
R. v. Triller49 has done the same for attempted bestiality and so has R.v.
Bartlett"0 for attempting to unlawfully cause bodily harm. It is
noteworthy that there is no judicial authority in support of the
proposition that all attempts are specific intent, thus permitting the
intoxication defence.
It is true that the Supreme Court decision in R. v. Ancio51 could alter
the law in this area. It was not an intoxication case but held that the intent
for attempted murder was only the intent to kill, not any of the other
intents for murder as set out in the Criminal Code.52 In Ancio, the Court
traced the history of attempts and concluded that attempts had evolved
46. Leary, supra, note 2, at 56.
47. R. v.Hornbuckle, [1945] V.L.R. 281. (V.FC.)
48. R. v. Pagee (1980), 4 W.C.B. 322. (B.C.Co. Ct.).
49. R. v. Triller(1980), 55 C.C.C. (2d) 411. (B.C.Co. Ct.).
50. R. v. Bartlett (1983), 5 C.C.C. (3d) 321, at 336. (Ont. H.C.).
51. R. v. Ancio (1984), 39 C.R. (3d) 1. (S.C.C.). It reversed the decision in Lajoie v. The
Queen, [1974] S.C.R. 399, which was relied upon in both Triller and Bartlett.
52. Code, supra, note 31, s. 212(a)(ii), (b), (c), s. 213 and s. 214(5) extend the definition of
murder to include constructive intents.
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much later than had the mental element for murder.5 3 An attempt
consists of some act directed toward the completed actus reus with the
intention to commit the full offence.54 For attempted murder, this was
interpreted to mean an intention to kill because the completed offence
required a death. It is possible, however, that Ancio could be
distinguished for the purposes of the intoxication rules on the basis that
murder, unlike most offences, has constructive intents. Moreover, it did
not deal at all with the intoxication rules.
There is an apt analogy here with the English law on the same point.
R. v. Whybrow55 settled the law in England that the intent for attempted
murder was the intent to kill. It was relied upon in Ancio. Yet this has not
meant that all attempts have been held to be specific intent. In R. v.
Pigg,56 again not an intoxication case, the Court of Appeal held that the
mens rea for attempted rape consisted of both intent to have intercourse
without consent and intent to have intercourse with recklessness as to
consent. In Caldwell,57 it was decided that all offences having recklessness
as a mental element did not allow the intoxication defence, Le. were not
specific intent offences. The conclusion is that attempted rape is not a
specific intent offence. If that is the case, there is no reason why all
attempted assaults should not be treated the same way,58 or, indeed, any
attempt for which the full offence has recklessness as a mental element.
The point is obviously still open even though the existing authority lies
in the direction of attempts following the completed offence. Nonetheless,
attempts pose a grave problem for the basic intent and Colvin theories.
Ultimately, this point will likely be decided on the basis of which
approach makes more sense. It is far from clear that the basic intent test
makes greater sense.
Another problem area is handling stolen goods or, in Canada,
possession of property knowing that is was obtained by the commission
of an indictable offence.59 Both of these offences have been held to be
specific intent offences even though neither has any obvious ulterior
53. Ancio, supra, note 51, at 18.
54. Code, supra, note 31, s. 24(1).
55. R. v. Whybrow (1951), 35 Cr. App. R. 51 (C.A.).
56. R. v. Pigg, [1982] 2 All E.R. 591. (C.A.).
57. Caldwell, supra, note 16. Smith and Hogan, supra, note 28, at 59-60, define ulterior intent
as excluding recklessness. This is in line with the majority in Caldwell and both are counter to
Colvin, supra, note 7, at 757, which, after all, was written prior to the decision in Caldwell. The
minority in Caldwell, like Colvin, would have permitted the intoxication defence for offences
of ulterior recklessness.
58. Since assaults have the same element, lack of the victim's consent, which can be satisfied
by either intention or recklessness.
59. Code, supra, note 31, s. 312.
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intent.60 An argument could be made that there is, however, an ulterior
intent involved where the property was obtained by theft. This is in the
sense that the possessor must know the property was stolen and, included
in knowledge of theft, is knowledge that it was taken with intent to
deprive the owner of lawful possession. It is this latter connection with
the taker's state of mind that would be considered an ulterior intent on
the possession offence. It must be said that this ulterior intent is not
obvious. There is no requirement for a conviction for possession that the
actual thief be convicted. Accordingly, if the thief was acquitted on
account of intoxication, it is not apparent that a subsequent possessor
having knowledge of the intoxicated taking would be acquitted simply
because of the taker's lack of intent.
On the other hand, possession of property knowing it was obtained by
the commission of an indictable offence arguably could be considered,
under the basic intent test, a basic intent offence because the knowledge
required does not extend past the actus reus. This is because theft is not
the only way for the property to be obtained. For example, laundering
money that was obtained from drug trafficking can be charged under the
same section.6' Then there is clearly no ulterior intent. All the same, the
offence has been categorized as specific intent.
On the other hand, the offence known colloquially as "joyriding" has,
in England, been held to be a basic intent offence 62 even though the
statutory offence apparently contains a purpose ulterior to the actual
taking of the conveyance. 63 The counterpart in Canada to this offence64
requires an intent to drive, use, operate or navigate which should be, by
the theory, an ulterior intent. In view of the English case MacPherson,
however, it might well be held to be a general intent offence.
Smith65 has pointed out that the offence of causing grievous bodily
harm with intent to cause grievous bodily harm has been wrongly
categorized by the basic intent test. Quite clearly the mens rea does not
60. R. v. Durante, [1972] 3 All E.R. 962. (C.A.); R. v. Bucci (1974), 17 C.C.C. (2d) 512.
(N.S. Co. Ct.); R. v. Courville (1982), 2 C.C.C. (3d) 118. (Ont. C.A.), affd (1985), 19 C.C.C.
(3d) 97. (S.C.C.). Williams, supra, note 6, also thinks that handling contains no ulterior intent.
The differences in wording between the Theft Act, 1968, c. 60, s. 22 (U.K.) and the Code, s.
312 appear not to be consequential since the elements in each case include an unlawful
possession of illegally obtained goods with the knowledge that they have that character.
61. This was, in fact, done in R. v. Hendin, (Ont. Prov. Ct.) Aug., 1985 (unreported) but
discussed in Don Brillinger, "Lawyer who laundered millions gets five-year term", Ontario
Lawyers Weekly, Aug. 9, 1985, at 17.
62. R. v. MacPherson, [1973] Crim. LR. 457. (C.A.)
63. Section 12 of the Theft Act 1968, c. 60, creates the offence of "taking a conveyance for
his own or another's use", certainly a purpose, hence intent, ulterior to the taking.
64. Criminal Code, supra, note 31, s. 295.
65. Smith, supra, note 6, at 377.
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extend at all beyond the actus reus but it has nonetheless been described
as a specific intent offence.6 6 The offence is not one known to Canadian
law. However, Smith's point is well-taken. Moreover, the offence is
worthy of consideration for a reason perhaps not so palatable to Smith,
one of the proponents of ulterior intent as an analytical tool.
It may be conjectural but the classification of the offence as specific
intent could have resulted from the fact that the intent required is
specified in the statutory enactment in clear terms. Yet, the language used
is identical to that used in most ulterior intent offences. These offences
very often can be discerned by the phrase "with intent to";67 hence, the
similarity of language for the present offence may have resulted in it being
judicially lumped in with ulterior intent offences. This offence shows that
judges are apt to be influenced by the language used in the statute.
Language which clearly demonstrates the mental element intended by
Parliament is more likely to be construed as specific intent, regardless of
whether the mens rea extends beyond the actus reus or not.
The charge in Steane 8 of doing an act likely to assist the enemy with
intent to assist the enemy also causes difficulty. The Colvin theory holds
that it is an ulterior intent offence because the word "likely" means that
the act need not be proven or actualized but that the specified intent must
be. It is therefore, on that argument, conduct in process that is being
penalized rather than conduct completed.69 It is again conjecture but it
would appear that Parliament injected the word "likely" in order to assist
the Crown in establishing the actus reus rather than out of any regard for
ulterior intent as a theoretical tool. To accept the ulterior intent theory,
one would have to say with certainty that excision of the word "likely"
would convert it into a basic intent offence. The precedent of causing
grievous bodily harm with intent to case grievous bodily harm suggests
otherwise. Moreover, one of the leading proponents of ulterior intent,
Lord Simon, has expressed the opinion that the Steane offence is not an
ulterior intent offence.70
The foregoing discussion illustrates the lack of unanimity that prevades
the categorization of offences. Even among the most avid adherents of
ulterior intent, there is disagreement. Colvin has said that all attempts are
ulterior intent, Smith and Hogan say they are all specific intent (without
66. Majewski, supra, note 3, at 154; Smith, id.
67. For example, break and enter with intent to commit an indictable offence therein.
68. R. v. Steane, [1947] 1 All E.R. 813. (C.A.). The charge was under s. 2A of the Defence
(General) Regulations, S.R. & 0. 1939/927 under authority of the Emergency Powers
(Defence) Act, 1939,2 & 3 Geo. 6, c. 62, s. 1.
69. Colvin, supra, note 7, at 759 uses this terminology.
70. Majewski, supra, note 3, at 154.
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citing any authority) 71 while the very same Smith has opined that
attempted suicide is, according to the basic intent theory, a basic intent
offence.72 Added to that is the possible difference in the meaning of basic
intent between Lord Elwyn-Jones and Lord Simon. While the basic
intent test and the Colvin theory do explain how most offences are
identified, they do not do so in all cases. Moreover, there is sufficient
confusion to cast doubt on their validity.
Nevertheless, it must be admitted that these tests are helpful. However,
even if it is conceded that the tests provide accurate ways of categorizing
offences, that does not answer the question whether there is any good
reason for allowing intoxication for ulterior intent offences but not for
basic intent offences. Colvin answers this objection by stating that is is
permissible to impose absolute liability for the prohibited act in the case
of basic intent offences. On the other hand, to impose such liability for
ulterior intent offences "would be to impose absolute liability for what
might have happened rather than what did happen." 73 It is not clear why
it is necessarily more acceptable to attach responsibility to one who,
without intent, recklessness or volition, has committed a basic intent
offence. After all, voluntariness and the mental element are cardinal
precepts of culpability. Further discussion on that point must await the
examination of the doctrine of prior fault later in this chapter. For now,
it should be noted that one of the strongest advocates of the concept of
ulterior intent, Smith, before Majewski, stated that:
... a rule based on the distinction between basic and ulterior intents
would be unacceptable because there is no reason in it. If a drunken
person takes my vase under the impression that it is his own and smashes
it, why should he be guilty of criminal damage, which does not require an
ulterior intent, but not guilty of theft, which does? The mistake as to
ownership negatives mens rea in both cases and it would be quite
irrational to impose liability in the one case and not the other.74
The basic intent test is, after all, a rather arbitrary way to limit the
intoxication defence. There is no readily apparent justification for
imposing culpability for doing a particular criminal act while alleviating
responsibility where the statutory enactment specifies an additional
mental element. In each case, the actor may not have had the requisite
mental state for the act itself.75 Smith's hypothetical show the inadequacy
of the basic intent test.
71. Smith and Hogan, supra, note 28, at 194.
72. Smith, supra, note 6, at 377.
73. Colvin, supra, note 7, at 760.
74. J. C. Smith, "Commentary", [1975] Crim L.. 572, at 574.
75. Schabas, supra, note 6 has also made this point.
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2. The Purposive Test
This test was first advanced in George76 by Justice Fauteux who said:
In considering the question of mens rea, a distinction is to be made
between (i) intention as applied to acts considered in relation to their
purposes and (ii) intention as applied to acts considered apart from their
purposes. A general intent attending the commission of the act is, in some
cases, the only intent required to constitute the crime while, in others, there
must be, in addition to that general intent, a specific intent attending the
purpose for the commission of the act.77
It may be that Justice Ritchie, in the same case, advanced a similiar
test78 but that is of no concern in the present context. The purposive
approach to distinguishing specific from general intent was approved in
both MajewskF9 and Leary.80 Indeed, Lord Simon reckoned that it was
"the best description of 'specific intent' in this sense" 8' that he knew.
There are problems in interpreting what really was meant by these
definitions. Consider first the traditional view of a voluntary act as
propounded by Austin8 2 and most later criminal law writers.83 In this
perspective, an act consists of (1) a muscular contraction and (2) a desire
or volition for the muscular contraction.84 It can therefore be seen that
every act that is "voluntary" within the meaning of the law is purposive
in the sense that the physical movement was accompanied by some desire
or will to make that movement. It is impossible therefore to say that one
type of intent involves a purpose where another does not: any voluntary
act is purposive. 8
Hart's modification of the Austinian approach leads to the same
conclusion. He described a voluntary act as being subordinated to the
actor's conscious plan of action.86 Surely a conscious plan of action
involves purposive action. If that is so, the purposive approach to intent
fails under the Hartian theory as well.
There is, however, another and probably better interpretation of the
Fauteux definitions, and that is to confine the meaning of purposive to
76. George, supra, note 4.
77. Id., at 877.
78. Id., at 890.
79. Majewski, supra, note 3, at 154,per Lord Simon.
80. Leary, supra, note 2, at 50.
81. Majewski, supra, note 3, at 154.
82. John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence (5th ed. Londonm John Murray, 1911) Vol. 1 at
411-17. For a synopsis of Austin's theory, I have relied upon H. L. A. Hart, Punishment and
Responsibility, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968) at 97-99.
83. Hart, id, at 99 lists several in note 24.
84. Id, at 97.
85. Schabas, supra, note 6 and Walker, supra, note 6 make this point as well.
86. Supra, note 82 at 105.
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the mens rea. In other words, the mens rea must be directed to achieving
some purpose. In this sense, purpose might be loosely equated with
ulterior intent. There is support for this view in the comments by Lord
Simon about the Fauteux test.87 There is then little point to repeating the
arguments made in the last section about the ulterior and basic intent
distinction.
I will therefore limit the discussion to particular offences. Applied in
that way, how does the purposive test fare? Several commentators88 have
demonstrated that it does not correctly categorize murder as a specific
intent offence. It is not essential for a murder conviction for the
prosecution to show any purpose in the sense of a desire to kill or cause
grievous bodily harm;89 it is enough that the accused was willing for
death to occur though her actual purpose was something else. As was
pointed out in the introduction, Swietlinsk9o has demonstrated that
murder cannot be explained by any of the tests except the Colvin test.
Murder is therefore a special case.
Other offences, however, also do not fit within the purposive test. One
such example in England is, again, the offence of taking a conveyance
without the consent of the owner. It would seem to require a purposive.
element but has been tagged as a basic intent offence.9' Though there is
no comparable authority in Canada, given the similarity of the wording
in our counterpart offence,92 it is quite probable that it would be
categorized as a general intent offence here as well.
One form of assault can involve a purpose to cause apprehension on
the part of the victim. 93 If the purposive test were used to explain this
offence, it would be seen as a specific intent offence. George, however, is
authority for the proposition that assault is a general intent offence; it is
extremely doubtful that assaults under s. 244(1)(b) would be treated
87. Supra, note3.
88. Smith, supra, note 6; Schabas, supra, note 6; Dashwood, supra, note 5; Walker, supra
note 6; Sellers, supra, note 6; Orchard, supra; note 6, all criticize the purposive test as failing
to account for murder. Long before Majewsk4 Stanley M. Beck and Graham E. Parker, "The
Intoxicated Offender-A Problem of Responsibility" (1966), 44 Can. Bar Rev. 563 also
criticized the purposive tesL
89. D.PP v. Hyar, [1974] 2 All E.R. 41. (H.L.) In Canada, under the Criminal Code, supra,
note 31, s. 212(a)(ii), according to Don Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law (Toronto: The
Carswell Company Limited, 1982) at 206, the same result is achieved. See also: R. v. Buzzanga
andDurocher (1979), 49 C.C.C. (2d) 369, at 384-85, which, though not a murder case, makes
the same point
90. Swietlinsk4 supra, note 10.
91. Supra, notes 62 and 63; Smith, supra, note 6, at 378; Majewsk4 supra, note 3, at 152.
92. Code s. 295 would seem to also require a purpose: "with intent to drive...".
93. Criminal Code, supra, note 31, s. 244(i)(b); P. v. Boomhower (1974), 20 C.C.C. (2d) 89
(Ont. C.A.). D.PP v. Morgan, [1975] 2 All E.R. 347, at 363-64 (C.A.) illustrates the same
point in England.
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differently from the other forms of assault for the purposes of the
intoxication rules.
To constitute theft, there is a requirement that the accused must have
intended to deprive the owner of the property.94 That intention may not,
however, have been the purpose of the accused. It is sufficient for theft
that the accused had foresight that deprivation of the owner was the
virtually certain consequence of the taking. The result is that, while theft
is a specific intent offence, it may not involve any purpose to deprive.
95
Instead, the accused might simply have the purpose in mind of acquiring
the stolen item. The purposive test does not, then, correctly classify theft,
mostly because "purpose" has a more restricted meaning than
"intention."
Some of the academic writers have failed to distinguish the two
interpretations I have accorded the Fauteux definitions. This may point
to difficulties in the test itself, rather than necessarily to errors by these
writers. For instance, Smith 96 has suggested that rape is a purposive
crime in that there is a purpose to have intercourse, even though there
may only be recklessness on the question of consent. This may be a result
of confusion as to whether purpose applies to the act (in this case, of
intercourse) or to the mental element in relation to the surrounding
circumstances. The question ultimately boils down to a semantical
dispute. Smith is certainly right that there is a mental element associated
with having intercourse. This mental element would appear to be
purposive97 but the offence as a whole is a basic or general intent
offence.98
Similarly, it has been suggested that indecent assault connotes a
purpose.99 To the contrary, Swietlinski has held that no indecent purpose
is required for conviction on such a charge.100 But, notwithstanding
Swietlinski, an indecent (or, now, a sexual assault) 101 could take place
that involved the inducing of apprehension by the victim in the same way
94. Code, s. 283(1)(a).
95. Eric Colvin, "Codification and Reform of the Intoxication Defence" (1983), 26 Crin
L.Q. 43, at 60-62, points out that the accused need not have the purpose to deprive. Several
cases hold theft to be a specific intent offence: Ruse v. Rea4 [1949] 1 K.B. 373; George, supra,
note 4; Majewsk4 supra, note 3; R. v.Regehr(1952), 13 C.R. 53 (Sask. Mag. CL)
96. Smith, supra, note 6, at 378.
97. Justice Dickson in Leary, supra, note 2, at 44, pointed out that "cases where a man will
have had intercourse without intending to do so must be rare."
98. Leary, id
99. Graham Parker, "Comment" (1977), 55 Can& BarRev. 691 makes this point.
100. R. v. Resener, [1968] 4 C.C.C. 129 (B.C.C.A.) and Swietlinsk4 supra, note 10 have held
indecent assult to be a general intent offence.
101. Code, supra, note 31, s. 246.1 as amended by S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 125, s. 19. The
offences of indecent assault and rape were repealed at the same time..
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as for common assault. 02 It would then have a purposive element.
Moreover, it could be argued that the usual form of assault, which
requires an intentional application of force, is also purposive in the sense
that intention implies purpose. Of course, purpose is often thought to be
a particular form of intention, referring to the reasons for having done the
act.103 But the use of the term "purpose" is an ambiguous one.
It should also be pointed out that the purposive test can be construed
as confusing the question of motive and intention104 Motive is not
required to be shown for an accused to be found culpable but the
purposive definition seems to inject motive into the culpability equation
for specific intention offences. This is particularly so if purpose is thought
to refer to the reasons for doing the act.
The purposive definition is, at the least, an imprecise definition. At
worst, it is quite meaningless. As a means of differentiating one type of
act from another, it is utterly devoid of content. As a means of
distinguishing the two types of intent, aside from failing to account for
some offences, it is so confusing as to be practically worthless. The
language used is, unfortunately, responsible for much of this confusion:
"purpose" is a nebulous word and, consequently, it is not clear from the
definition just what is meant.
Finally, as with the basic intent and Colvin theories, the purposive test
gives no convincing reason why certain types of offences should permit
intoxication to negative the mental element while others do not. Again,
the question is this: Does it make sense to allow evidence of drunkenness
to shed doubt on the intent to steal but not for an assault committed at
the same time? That is the result in George. But is it "logical"?
3. The Recklessness Test
Canada and England have taken somewhat divergent paths in defining
recklessness as a general feature of culpability. In Canada, with some
exceptions,'05 recklessness is considered to be confined to the situation
where the actor chooses to take an unjustifiable risk.le 6 There is therefore
a requirement that the accused advert to the risk of the particular harm.
102. Code, id, s. 244(1)(b) applies to all assault offences. This, in fact was Parker's point.
103. Alan R. White, "Intention, Purpose, Foresight and Desire" (1976), 92 L.Q.R. 569, at
574.
104. Beck and Parker, supra, note 88, at 586.
105. E.g.: R. v. Torrie, [1967] 3 C.C.C. 303 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Belbeck, [1968] 2 C.C.C. 331
(N.S.S.C.A.D.); R. v. Rogers, [1968] 4 C.C.C. 278 (B.C.C.A.) all applied objective tests. P. v.
Tutton and Tutton (1985), 44 C.R. (3d) 193 (Ont., C.A.) suggests applying Caldwell
recklessness to commissions but advertent recklessness to most omissions.
106. See, eg.: O'Grady v. Sparling, [1960] S.C.R. 804 (S.C.C.); R. v. City of Sault Ste, Marie,
[197812 S.C.R. 1299, at 1309-10.
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England has, in recent years, departed from advertent recklessness. The
leading case, Caldwell,107 defined recklessness as including both advertent
recklessness and failure to give thought to a risk in circumstances where,
if thought were given, the risk would be obvious. The decision was
controversial and has, to some extent,108 been whittled down.
This, the first of the two propositions for which Caldwell stands, has
not been adopted in Canada. The recent Supreme Court decision in
Sansregret v. The Queen'0 9 re-affirmed the advertent approach to
recklessness in Canada. Although the judgment introduces, arguably, a
new approach to the concept of wilful blindness,110 it can be seen as an
implicit rejection of Caldwell recklessness.'
However, when the intoxication defence is considered, the English and
Canadian positions are much closer together. The House of Lords in
Majewski used differing recklessness tests' 2 but the common approach in
their judgments was to ascribe recklessness to one who reduced herself
through the voluntary ingestion of drink or drugs to a state where she
lacked the mental element for a basic intent offence. At the point that
Majewski was decided, an objection could have been raised that the term
"recklessness" had more than one meaning in England."13
The second proposition from Caldwell changed that. It was that the
intoxication defence could not apply to any offence having recklessness
107. Caldwell supra, note 16.
108. Pigg supra, note 56, at 599 modified Caldwell recklessness by adding a requirement of
"indifference", perhaps meaning that the accused would have taken the risk even if thought had
been given to it. This approach has been taken by the Court of Appeal in a line of rape cases
and re-injects a note of subjectivism into the definition of recklessness.
109. Sansregret v. The Queen [1985] 3 W.W.R. 701, at 711,713-14 (S.C.C.)
I10. Id, at 713-14. The concept of wilful blindness is different from its usual application as
a limited extension of actual knowledge where the accused almost knows (le., is at least
reckless) and choose to maintain ignorance. Sansregret wilful blindness is, on the other hand,
a substitute for recklessness rather than being dependent upon recklessness already being
present. See" Eric Colvin, Principles of Criminal Law (Toronto: The Carswell Company
Limited, 1986) at 103-108.
111. Caldwell was never mentioned in SansregreL
112. Lords Elwyn-Jones, L.C., Diplock, Kilbrandon, Simon of Glaisdale, and Edmund-
Davies agreed that self-induced intoxication amounts itself to recklessness which is sufficient to
itself to constitute the mens rea for basic intent offences. Lord Edmund-Davies added that
drunkenness amounting to recklessness of probable consequences was basic intent. Lord
Russell stated that, because of its moral turpitude, intoxication amounted to recklessness as to
possible consequences. It is submitted that in view of the subsequent decision in Caldwell these
differences in language are not material.
113. In other than intoxication cases, recklessness meant taking a conscious risk that was
unjustifiable: P. v. Cunningham, [1957] 2 All E.R. 412, at 414 (C.A.). Majewski devised a new
sort of recklessness in intoxication cases: self-induced intoxication plus the commission of the
aclus reus of a basic intent offence equals recklessness. It is a general type of recklessness not
requiring advertence to the risk of that particular actus reus.
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as its mental element. Despite a vigorous dissent,114 this is so even where
the recklessness requirement is ulterior to the actus reus. The act of
getting intoxicated combined with the commission of the actus reus of a
basic intent offence amounts to criminal recklessness; and recklessness
can never be negatived by intoxication: these are the results of Majewski
and Caldwell. It is therefore an objective test in the sense that it is an
attribution of a mental state: if a reasonable (that is, sober) person in the
place of the accused would have adverted to the risk, the accused is
deemed to have been reckless. 15
Canada, in Leary, adopted Majewski but has not adopted Caldwell."
6
Leary quoted extensively from the various judgments in Majewski,
making it difficult to know which of the tests advanced there were
approved for Canada. On the supposition that Leary has in some
measure adopted the recklessness test," 7 the Canadian position is that
there are two types of recklessness: advertent recklessness" 18 and
recklessness supplied by being intoxicated and committing a general
intent offence. Support for the recklessness test may also be seen in R. v.
Schmidtke."9 That case held that all offences, other than murder, which
have recklessness as a mental element are general intent offences.120
England therefore has adopted a more or less consistent approach to
recklessness, an objectivist standard which subsumes within it situations
where the accused was too intoxicated to perceive the risk. If the accused,
when sober, would have adverted to the risk, she is deemed to have been
reckless. Canada's position does not have that attribute of consistency
since recklessness, absent any issue of intoxication, usually imports
foresight of the particular risk; assuming that Canada has adopted the
recklessness test, when intoxication is involved, recklessness is simply
attributed to the accused. The Canadian position might therefore be justly
114. Caldwell, supra, note 16, at 968-973. Lord Edmund-Davies, using the basic intent test,
would have permitted the intoxication defence for ulterior recklessness.
115. See: R. v. Bailey, [1983] 2 All E.R. 503 (C.A.) and R. v. Hardie, [1984] 3 All E.R 848
(C.A.). In both cases, the Court of Appeal seemed to be attempting a reinstatement of some
requirement of advertence to a risk of the taking of a substance. The distinction lies in the
nature of the substance itself. Alcohol or dangerous drugs are to be treated differently from
other substances not generally known to be dangerous. Whether this is a maintainable
distinction will be discussed later in the chapter.
116. There may yet be some inroads by Caldwell v. Tutton and Tutton, supra, note 105, seems
to say, in cases of criminal negligence, that advertence to the risk is necessary in the case of an
ommission but not for a commission. Note also wilful blindness in Sansregre, supra, note 109.
117. Leary, supra, note 2, at 52, quotes Lord Elwyn-Jones, in Majewsk supra, note 3, at 150,
a passage which uses the recklessness test.
118. There is abundant authority for a requirement of advertence: Sansregre supra, note 109;
City of Sault Ste. Marie, supra, note 106; Pappaohn, supra, note 4.
119. R. v. Schmidtke (1985), 44 C.R. (3d) 392, at 396 (Ont. C.A.).
120. Admittedly, Schmitdke, at 397, also seemed to apply the basic intent test.
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criticized on that ground alone: it is plainly silly that a single word should
be defined in different ways in the criminal law.
That preliminary point aside, can the ascription of recklessness to a
person intoxicated to the extent of in fact lacking the mental element be
logically justified?
The first difficulty with the recklessness test is that it provides no way
of determining what offences have recklessness as a mental element. To
say that all recklessness offences are basic or general intent offences is to
beg the question. It is true that sometimes Parliament defines an offence
in such a way as to disclose the mental element and, indeed, on occasion
expressly includes recklessness. Examples such as the extended definition
accorded "wilfully" in our Criminal Code21 and in the very section 122
considered in Caldwell illustrate this. But, for many other offences, we
only learn whether recklessness is a mental element after it is judicially
determined to be so. Thus, in England, the act of applying force in an
assault can be committed either recklessly or intentionally'23 while in
Canada the act itself must arguably be done intentionally.124 However, in
both countries, recklessness as to the victim's consent will suffice for
culpability. The same position applies to rape'25 and sexual assault.
126
It is true that some authority has held that recklessness is a mental
element for any offence for which no particular mens rea is specified in
the enactment. For instance, it has been said:
The general mens rea which is required and which suffices for most crimes
where no mental element is mentioned in the definition of the crime, is
either the intentional or reckless bringing about of the result which the
law, in creating the offence, seeks to prevent.. .127
[emphasis mine]
Nonetheless, precise criteria have not been established for determining
when recklessness is one of the mental elements for an offence. That is a
telling criticism of the recklessness test for only ex post facto can we
determine when it is or is not part of the offence.
121. Criminal Code, supra, note 31, s. 386.
122. CriminalDamageAct 1971, c. 48, s. 1(1). (U.K.)
123. R. v. Venna, [1975] 3 All E.R. 788, at 793 (C.A.)
124. Code, supra, note 31, s. 244 (1)(a) requires an "intentional" application of force. See
also: 1? v. Starratt (1971), 5 C.C.C. (2d) 32 (Ont. C.A.). Contra is R v. Lafontaine (1979),
9 C.R. (3d) 263 (Que. S.C.).
125. Morgan, supra, note 17; Sansregre4 supra, note 109. Rape is no longer an offence in
Canada.
126. R. v. Alderton (1985), 44 C.R. (3d) 254. (Ont. C.A.) held sexual assault to be an assault
with some element of sexual gratification. The "without consent" aspect of assault is common
to that of rape and must import the same mental states. This is not, however, specified in the
definition of assault in s. 244 of the Code.
127. Buzzanga andDurocher, supra, note 89, at 381.
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There is another reason why not allowing the intoxication defence for
recklessness offences is problematic. Why is the line drawn at
recklessness? In dissent in Caldwell, Lord Edmund-Daview was alive to
the harshness that would result from excluding the intoxication defence
where the offence was one of ulterior recklessness.1 2 But the same
argument can be made with much force in respect of "basic" recklessness.
Take the well-known hypothetical wherein the accused has placed a
bomb on a crowded airplane with the desire, not to kill the passengers,
but to blow up the plane. Most commentators have had no difficulty in
nonetheless finding the intention to kill the passengers on the basis that
the actor knows that death of the passengers is a virtual certainty and she
is willing to accomplish those deaths in the course of achieving her
purpose.1
29
It can be seen, however, that a "virtual certainty" is marginally less
certain than a "certainty". In other words, intention encompasses
something more than absolute intention. As a result, it impinges, however
slightly, upon the concept of recklessness which involves (in Canada)
advertence and the taking of an unjustifiable risk. "And 'intention' and
'recklessness' are more than birds of a feather; they are blood-
brothers." 30 That being so, why does the intoxication test assume that
there is a marked difference in culpability between an intentional act and
a reckless one? That is the implicit "logic" of the recklessness test. But is
it a valid distinction? There is apt to be a difference of opinion about
whether a particular risk was virtually certain, highly probable, probable
or merely possible. 31 To maintain a culpability distinction on such
shifting ground is extremely arbitrary.
There is a further argument that the recklessness test is inconsistent
with general principle and hence unfair. In Canada, general principle
requires a subjective test of mens rea, which in the case of recklessness
means advertence to the particular risk.' 32 Perhaps it was stated best by
Justice Dickson in Leary:
128. Caldwell supra, note 16, at 972.
129. Glanville Williams, Textbook of CriminalLaw (2nd. ed. London: Stevens & Sons, 1983)
at 85 holds to this view, for example. So do Smith and Hogan, supra note 28, at 48.
130. Caldwell supra, note 16, at 970.
131. Smith and Hogan, supra, note 28, and Stuart, supra, note 89, at 129-30 note the
controversy. R. v. Moloney, [1985] 1 All E.R. 1025. (H.L.) has now, in England, restricted
intention to the virtually certain category; Buzzanga and Durocher, supra, note 89, does the
same here but that does not answer when something is virtually certain as opposed to highly
probably or probable. In any case, Buzzanga and Durocher has not been explicitly adopted by
the Supreme Court.
132. England via Caldwell and subsequent cases has, of course, departed from subjective
recklessness.
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Recklessness in a legal sense imports foresight. Recklessness cannot exist
in the air; it must have reference to the consequences of a particular act.
In the circumstances of a particular case, the ingestion of alcohol may be
sufficiently connected to the consequences as to constitute recklessness in
a legal sense with respect to the occurrence of the prohibited act. But to say
that everyone who gets drunk is thereby reckless and therefore
accountable is to use the word "recklessness" in a non-legal sense and, in
effect, in the case of an intoxicated offender, to convert any crime into one
of absolute or strict liability.133
It can be seen that this criticism is founded upon the maxim actus non
facit reum nisi mens sit rea and upon both principles involved in the
maxim: the recklessness test violates subjective mens rea and
contemporaneity of actus reus and mens rea.
The majority of the Australian High Court in R. v. O'Connor 34 raised
the same points. Justice Murphy of that Court showed that the test
represents an anomaly because an intoxicated offender is guilty by virtue
of a constructive mental element where, for the same offence, a sober
person lacking the requisite mental element would be acquitted. 135 Thus,
once intoxication is proved, the prosecution is relieved altogether from
the burden of proving a mental element. This led Justice Murphy to muse
that, where intoxication was involved, the Crown might very well lead
evidence of it in order to head off attempts by the defence to show a lack
of the requisite mental element. In other words, the defence might allege
not intoxication to the point of negating the mental element, but a lack
of the mental element simpliciter and the Crown would rebut this with
evidence of intoxication. Thus, an intoxicated person would be much
worse off than a sober person who had done the same act: the latter could
rely upon a lack of mens rea while the former, who might have lacked
the mens rea even if sober, would be convicted because of being
intoxicated. 36 Never has it been suggested that an intoxicated offender is
more culpable than a sober one. Yet that is the effect of the recklessness
test. Indeed, if mitigation of punishment was the reason for the gradual
acceptance of the intoxication defence,137 that reason is quite perverted by
133. Leary, supra; note 2, at 46.
134. 1. v. O'Connor (1980), 29 A.L.R. 449 (Aust. H.C.). Chief Justice Barwick, at 464,
echoes Justice Dickson and Justice Aickin, at 492, actually quotes Dickson.
135. Id-, at 485. See also: note 214, infra.
136. It is conceded that this result would not evitably follow. It might be that the pragmatic
approach adopted in the case of insanity being raised by the Crown would be applied to only
allow the evidence to be considered once it had been determined that the accused had done
the act with the requisite mens rea. See: 1. v. Simpson (1977), 35 C.C.C. (2d) 337, at 363.
(Ont. C.A.) for the analogous point in relation to insanity.
137. Although I do not necessarily agree that it was. See:supra, note 1.
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the attribution of recklessness to persons who have committed a criminal
act while sodden.13
One might conclude from the leading cases that only crimes whose
sole mental element is intention would allow the defence. But, as
Glanville Williams has pointed out, t39 this is not the case for murder.
Once again, murder cannot be accounted for by the recklessness test. In
some of its forms, the mental element can be supplied by recklessness, 140
yet the intoxication defence is always allowed for murder.141 Again,
murder can only be explained as a special case.
There are other, perhaps more telling arguments against the
recklessness test. Underlying all of the various tests for determining
whether an offence is of specific or general intent is an acceptance that a
person is culpable, for general intent offences, by becoming intoxicated.
I have already pointed that this violates both the principle of
contemporaneity and subjective notions of mens rea. In the interests of
brevity, I will deal with the question of justification for this underlying
doctrine, prior fault, later in the article.
4. Conclusions About the Various Tests
To recapitulate, the tests set out in Majewski and accepted in Leary
provide no reliable way of differentiating one type of offence from
another. The major offences for which difficulty is encountered are:
murder, attempts, possession of property obtained by the commission of
an indictable offence, joyriding, doing an act likely to assist the enemy
with intent to assist the enemy, certain assaults, and causing grievous
bodily harm with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. Though many
other offences can be answered by reference to one or more of these tests,
the fact that there is no effective method points to a flaw in the respective
theories. In short, rather than attempt to analyze offences by the use of
any of these tests, it is just as simple to memorize the offences which have
been placed in either category. 142 For those offences not yet categorized,
it remains to be seen how these tests will apply.
There are, in addition, other difficulties with these tests. If the
dichotomy of specific and general intent is meant to limit the intoxication
defence, it does not always accomplish that end. It is true that there is
138. Justice Dickson, in Leary, supra, note 2, at 41, made this point.
139. Supra note6.
140. Code, supra, note 31, ss. 2 12(a)(ii), 212(b), 212(c) and, for ss. 213 and 214(5), where the
underlying offence has recklessness as a mental element.
141. Swietinsk4 supra, note 10.
142. Gold, supra, note 6; Stuart, supra; note 89, at 361; Smith and Hogan, supra, note 28, at
193-94, have done just that.
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frequently a lesser included general intent offence for which an accused
is liable even if acquitted of the more serious specific intent offence. But
this does not happen in all cases. 43 For example, theft has no lesser
included offence. Neither does possession of property knowing it to have
been obtained from the commission of an indictable offence, 144 break and
enter with intent to commit an indictable offence therein'45 or bribing a
peace officer. 146 These may in isolation be minor criticisms but the
cumulative effect of the objections is telling.
Furthermore, to withhold the intoxication defence for general or basic
intent offences is a violation of both subjectivist principle and the
principle of contemporaneity of mens rea and actus reus. Whether those
departures from principle can logically be justified in some other fashion
will be discussed in conjunction with the concept of prior fault and
different approaches to mens rea. For now, it is enough to note the
apparent inconsistencies with principle and to suggest that this raises a
prima facie case of "illogicality".
5. Ulterior Intent
It will have been noticed that lurking beneath both the basic intent and
purposive tests was the concept of ulterior intent. Indeed, since Caldwell
ruled out the intoxication defence for any offence having recklessness as
a mental element, most of the offences permitting the intoxication
defence are ulterior intent offences. (The previous discussion hopefully
demonstrated, however, that some specific intent offences do not require
an ulterior intent.) Some of the difficulties with the different tests arise
from ulterior intent itself. Glanville Williams 47 has noted the confusion
between motive and intention that can occur -with the use of the term.
That was conceded by the originator of the term, Stroud, who seems to
have been the first to use it in his book Mens Rea. 48 But the complaint
is much more deep-seated: if there were no division into specific and
general (or basic) intent, there would be no need for the concept of
ulterior intent. To use Steane 49 as an example, if there were no such
143. This argument was made by Justice Stephen in O'Connor, supra, note 134, at 476, and
by Glanville Williams, supra, note 6.
144. Criminal Code, supra, note 31, s. 312.
145. Id, s. 306(1)(a).
146. Id, s. 109(b), held to be specific intent in R. v. Dees (1978), 40 C.C.C. (2d) 58 (Ont.
C.A.).
147. Williams, supra, note 129, at 75,87.
148. Douglas Aikenhead Stroud, Mens Rea (London: Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd., 1914) at 112-
15.
149. Steane, supra, note 68. See also notes 69 and 70: Colvin and Lord Simon disagree as to
whether the offence is of ulterior intent or not.
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concept as ulterior intent, would it really matter? It seems unnecessary to
engage in the debate about whether or not the offence in that particular
case is ulterior intent or not. What is important is the meaning of
intention or of recklessness. The disputes arising out of those terms are
quite sufficient to complicate the criminal law without further clouding it
with a concept that has utility only if the dichotomy between specific and
general intent is accepted.
Take break and enter with intent to commit an indictable offence
therein as an example. This is an offence for which the intoxication
defence is permitted, 150 on the Colvin theory because it contains an
ulterior intent, the intent to commit an indictable offence therein. But the
accused, absent intoxication, to be convicted must have two different
thoughts on her mind, that of intentionally breaking and entering and that
of intending to commit some offence inside. Once these two thoughts are
differentiated into two different kinds of intent, it is a very short step back
into the specific and general intent dichotomy.' 5' There- is no sound
reason why the liability of the accused should only depend upon the
intent to commit an offence inside the premises. Worse than that, because
of the antecedents of ulterior intent and its potential confusion with
motive, there is the danger of the criminal law reverting once more to that
older school of mens rea advocated in Prince,152 by Stroud,153 and
resurrected in Majewski.54
Under this theory, ulterior or specific intent (though they are not
always synonymous) are counterposed to mens rea, which corresponds
roughly with a general intention to break the law. The latter has,
however, in the intoxication cases, nothing whatever to do with
"intention" to do the particular prohibited act and everything to do with
transposing the fault involved in getting into an incapacitated condition
into the kind of culpability required by the criminal law. Those
advocating ulterior intent as a concept, Smith and Hogan' 55 and Colvin,
do not, of course, agree with this older view of mens rea; indeed, they
oppose it vigorously. Nevertheless, the use of the term gives credence to
the differentiation into different sorts of intent, thus running the risk of it
providing support for that other, largely discredited concept of mens rea.
150. There are many cases on this, R. v. Campbell (1974), 17 C.C.C. (2d) 320 (Ont. C.A.)
being one example.
151. Glanville Williams, "The Mental Element of Crime" (1975), 125 NL.J. 968 made the
same criticism of the ulterior-basic intent distinction.
152. R. v. Pr'nce, [1874-80] All E.R. Rep. 881 (Crown Cases Reserved).
153. Stroud, supra, note 148, at 15.
154. Majewsk4 supra, note 3. Stroud was quoted with approval by Lords Elwyn-Jones and
Lord Edmund-Davies. Stannard, supra, note 7 has analyzed Majewski in this fashion.
155. Smith and Hogan, supra; note 28.
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This is an opportune point at which to embark upon a discussion of the
concept of prior fault as it is very much founded upon that other view of
mens rea. In closing off the present discussion, it should be emphasized
that the myriad tests carry with them the potential association with and,
hence, justification for a view of mens rea that is incompatible with the
modem concept of particularized mens rea. Whether this return to a
former approach to mens rea is appropriate and tenable is a topic to
which I will now turn.
III. Prior Fault and Mens Rea Theory
Transferring the fault requirement from the actual doing of the act to the
act of becoming cognitively impaired underlies the concept of prior fault.
This concept, not unique to the intoxication defence, holds that where an
accused is at fault for being in an incapacitated condition, it is no answer
that her subsequent act was involuntary or without mens rea. Because it
has somewhat wider application than in intoxication cases, and because
it is bound up with the possible resurrection of an older form of mens rea,
I propose to devote some discussion to the concept.
The two major issues associated with the prior fault doctrine were
alluded to previously. The first involves the age-old debate between
objective and subjective tests for the mental element. In the context of the
prior fault theory, this translates into whether the accused must, at some
point in time, have intended to become or been reckless about becoming
incapacitated or intoxicated or whether simple negligence will suffice.
Indeed, as will be seen, there are good grounds for the view that the law
imposes absolute liability once self-induced incapacity or intoxication is
shown.
There are cases on either side of this debate. Majewski and Leary both
proceeded on the assumption that the particular accused intended to
become intoxicated; hence, neither case discussed whether the fault
should be judged by a subjective or an objective test. Perhaps that is
because both cases involved alcohol consumption with Majewski also
having taken some other drugs for other than medical reasons. Since
Majewski, however, two cases in England, Bailey5 6 and Hardie,157 have
interpreted the fault requirement in a subjective sense.
In Bailey, the accused, a diabetic, may have gone into a hypoglycaemic
state by failing to eat after taking insulin. Automatism had not been put
to the jury because the trial judge considered the condition to have been
self-induced. The Court of Appeal disagreed, saying that automatism
156. Bailey, supra, note 115.
157. Hardie, supra, note 115.
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ought to have been considered by the jury (although the appeal was
dismissed for evidentiary reasons). A distinction was made between
dangerous drugs or alcohol and a failure to eat food after taking insulin.
For the latter, it would be necessary to show that the accused was
subjectively reckless about becoming automatous, "aggressive,
unpredictable or uncontrolled". 15 For alcohol or dangerous drugs, this
would be assumed since
[i]t is common knowledge that those who take [such substances] may
become aggressive or do dangerous or unpredictable things; they may be
able to foresee the risks of causing harm to others, but nevertheless persist
in their conduct. 159
The decision in Hardie extended this holding somewhat. There, the
accused had taken valium that had not been prescribed to him.
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal held that subjective recklessness was
required:
There was no evidence that it was known to the appellant or even
generally known that the taking of valium in the quantity taken would be
liable to render a person aggressive or incapable of appreciating risks to
others or have other side effects such that its self-administration would
itself have an element of recklessness. It is true that valium is a drug and
it is true that it was taken deliberately and not taken on medical
prescription, but the drug is, in our view, wholly different in kind from
drugs which are liable to cause unpredictability or aggressiveness. 160
Thus, it would seem that, in England, whether the test for fault in
getting into an incapacitated condition is subjective or objective depends
upon whether the cause for the condition is generally known to have that
result. If it is, so long as the condition was self-induced, culpability will
lie. If it is not, there is an inquiry into the accused's state of mind.
Canada could have adopted the same approach but has not. R. v.
King'61 is the leading case. The accused had been given an anaesthetic
drug by his dentist, resulting in an impaired condition during which he
was involved in a motor vehicle accident. The Supreme Court upheld
acquittal but for differing reasons. Justice Taschereau imposed a
subjective test for fault162 but Justice Ritchie, with whom Justice
Martland concurred, used an objective test. 63 Interestingly, Justice
Ritchie made the same distinction made in Hardie concerning common
158. Bailey, supra; note 115, at 507.
159. Ia
160. Hardie, supra, note 115, at 853.
161. R v. King, [1962] S.C.R. 746.
162. Id, at 750.
163. Id, at 763, 764.
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knowledge about particular drugs.164 The distinction has not been
maintained through other cases. Canadian courts have applied negligence
as the fault requirement for all intoxication and automatism cases165
This really indicates that, in Canada, the recklessness test is not a test
of recklessness at all but of negligence. A reasonable person would not get
into such a state of intoxication; the standard of care has not been met,
therefore the actor is deemed reckless and guilty of a general intent
offence. There is no inquiry into the actor's state of mind at all.
The threshold question is therefore whether a negligent standard is
justifiable at all. The distinction between subjective and objective tests is
often found to be on the basis that, under a subjective test, all of the
personal factors of the accused can be taken into account. 166 On the other
hand, a completely objective test would judge a 14-year-old mentally
deficient child by the same standard as an average adult of normal
intelligence.167 As a result, some have proposed that individual factors
should be taken into account in determining negligence.168 Unfortunately,
the case law has limited the factors that can be considered. Age 169 has
been held to be a permissible factor for adjusting the objective standard
but several others, such as the "character, background, temperament,
idiosyncrasies or the drunkenness of the accused"' 70 have been ruled out.
Presumably, therefore, a lack of experience would not be taken into
account in assessing negligence. Thus, as an example, a first-time drinker
could be found negligent even though that particular individual had no
164. Id, at 764. 1 have taken the position that the Court of Appeal in Hardie, supra, note 115,
at 853, adopted a subjective test. However, the language used might be susceptible of another
interpretation that would bring it very much in line with the approach taken by Ritchie, J. in
King; if a particular drug is "generally known" to produce aggressive or incapacitated
behavior, this might suffice to constitute recklessness. The result might well be that the tests laid
down in King and Hardie are much alike in that the test used will vary according to the nature
of the drug ingested and the general knowledge by society of its effects.
165. Rabey v. The Queen (1980), 15 C.R. (3d) 225, at 260 (S.C.C.); R. v. Saxon (1975), 22
C.C.C. (2d) 370 (Alta. C.A.); R. v. McDowell (1980), 52 C.C.C. (2d) 298 (Ont. C.A.); R. v.
Marianchuk (1978), 4 C.R. (3d) 178 (Sask. C.A.).
166. Stuart, supra, note 89, at 120 and 184.
167. Id, at 184.
168. Among them, Hart, supra,Inote 82.
169. R. v. Cadwallader, [1966] 1 C.C.C. 380 (Sask. Q.B.). The case dealt with self-defence
which has an objective component. R. v. Hill (1986), 25 C.C.C. (3d) 322 (S.C.C.) may have
changed the objective standard in provocation to reflect the age and sex of the accused, but it
has not been made a mandatory direction to a jury.
170. Wright v. The Queen, [1969] 3 C.C.C. 258 (S.C.C.). The case involved provocation. In
England, the position is somewhat different. D.PP v. Camplin, [1978] 2 All E.R. 168 (H.L.)
allowed such other characteristics as age, race and personal idiosyncrasies to be considered but
excluded bad temper and drunkenness. On the other hand, in the recent case of Elliott v. C.,
[1983] 2 All E.R. 1005 (Div. Ct.), the Court, in applying an objective standard, struggled with
but rejected taking into consideration the mental deficiency of a young girl.
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prior personal knowledge upon which to rely in deciding to choose
whether to drink.171
Hart, among others, 172 has attempted to modify the negligence
standard:
(i) Did the accused fail to take those precautions which any reasonable
man with normal capacities would in the circumstances have taken?
(ii) Could the accused, given his mental and physical capacities, have
taken those precautions? 73
Hart's test is slightly more favourable to the accused than the usual
negligence test because it leans more to subjectivism. He has allowed
room for the accused's mental and physical attributes to provide excuses
for not having exercized the care that a reasonable person would have
taken. Nonetheless, the scope for the excuses is necessarily narrow when
confined only to mental and physical capacities. Hart himself has
recognized this:
It is of course quite arguable that no legal system could afford to
individuate the conditions of liability so far as to discover and excuse all
those who could not attain the average or reasonable man's standard. It
may, in practice, be impossible to do more than excuse those who suffer
from gross forms of incapacity, viz. infants, or the insane, or those afflicted
with recognizably inadequate powers of control over their movements, or
who are clearly unable to detect or extricate themselves from situations in
which their disability may work harm. 74
It is a conundrum for those who wish to use an objective standard but
try to individualize it: if it is individualized too far, it becomes, in reality,
a subjective test. On the other hand, to alleviate only for gross forms of
incapacity renders culpable all those who through inexperience, cultural
differences or mere ignorance have failed to meet a mythical standard of
care.
171. An example noted by, inter alia, Justice Dickson in Leary, supra, note 2, at 46 and
Justice Stephen in O'Connor, supra, note 134, at 475. Such a result would be analogous to
what occurred in R. v. Lynch (1982), 69 C.C.C. (2d) 88 (Nfld. C.A.), where, due to a medical
condition unknown to the accused, his blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit after
consumption of an amount of alcohol which, for a normal person, would not have resulted in
that blood alcohol level. Despite his lack of intention or recklessness in exceeding the legal
limit, the Court found him liable on the basis of his voluntary consumption of alcohol!
172. E.g.: Toni Pickard, "Culpable Mistakes and Rape: Relating Mens Rea to the Crime"
(1980), 30 U. of T L. 75; George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 1978).
173. Hart, supra, note 82, at 154. Hart speaks generally of the application to criminal law of
negligence. Others have expressed similar views. For a summary, see: Stuart, supra, note 89,
at 184-88. Prior fault is usually advocated only in narrower circumstances such as incapacity
or continuing transactions.
174. Hart, id, at 155.
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Hall175 has given several reasons why negligence should not generally
be extended into the criminal law. Among these are the following:
1. Criminal law is meant to cover only the most serious harm to social
values and, because it involves punishment, should be restricted to
only the most culpable forms of fault - that is, voluntary wrong-
doing. Moreover, there is a large element of chance to inadvertent
harm. Since negligence is not a condition voluntarily produced, to
punish for negligence is to punish only because the actor had the
capacity to take care, not for harm voluntarily caused.176
2. In determining culpability in a criminal sense, we should not confuse
"blame expressed in a judgment for damages and the blame implied
in punishing a criminal."'
177
3. It becomes an impossible function for a judge or jury to determine
whether a particular accused had the competence to appreciate the
risks in the specific situation.178 It is, first, an artificial test and,
second, there may not be sufficient information available to the trier
of fact to make the determination in any event.
4. There is no evidence nor has any reason been advanced to show why
it is thought that a negligent person could have been more careful in
the particular situation.179 In cases of thoughtlessness, for instance,
the mere fact of thoughtlessness suggests that the person, by virtue of
not thinking, could not have taken more care.
5. Closely tied to this is the notion of the utility of punishment. It is
generally though that punishment has a deterrent effect. Hall dealt
with both specific and general deterrence of negligent behavior.
Insofar as specific deterrence is concerned, he pointed out that the
efficacy of deterrence even for intentional or reckless conduct has not
been proven.i80 As for general deterrence:
The utilitarian thesis of general deterrence rests on the assumption that
newspaper reports that such persons have been punished wiU cause an
otherwise careless person to be careful. But what does that mean? If it
means that he will be aware of or alert to risks we deal with recklessness.
If knowledge of possible penal liability does not make him sensitive to
danger, inadvertency is not reduced.'
8'
[emphasis mine]
175. Jerome Hall, Law, Social Science and Criminal Theory (Littleton, Colo.: Fred B.
Rothman & Co., 1982).
176. Id, at 248, et seq.
177. d, at 255.
178. Id, at 257.
179. I, at 260.
180. Id, at 262.
181. Id
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While these complaints were directed against the application generally
of negligence to the criminal law, it is suggested that they are apposite to
the present discussion. Negligent fault in becoming intoxicated is too
severe a departure from the usual standard of culpability in criminal law
to be warranted. Since there are few cases of involuntary intoxication, 8 2
it is apparent that fault through negligence in practice verges on absolute
liability. That is, once intoxication is shown, there is absolute liability for
any general intent offence committed.183 Moreover, if subjective
culpability is the usual criminal standard, there is no justification for a
departure from this standard only for intoxicated or automatous
offenders.
But is it any more justifiable to adopt a subjective test for fault in
getting into an incapacitated condition? The concept of prior fault has
been argued as a principled exception to the contemporaneity rule.184 But
is it?
One problem with ascribing fault to one who chooses not to avoid
incapacity or who fails to take precautions is to know what constitutes
subjective fault. Normally, on a subjective test, there is a requirement that
the particular accused have foresight. It is important to be able to
pinpoint some time when there was this foresight in order to constitute
fault. Otherwise, the entire prior fault doctrine could be justly criticized
on the ground that it is far too uncertain and remote from the eventual
criminal act to constitute mens rea.1 85 The question of remoteness goes to
the foreseeability, not just of the prohibited act, but also of the condition
of incapacity. By definition, in cases where the intoxication defence is
advanced, there is at least some doubt as to the accused's intention or
awareness of the act being committed. Whatever "fault" the accused may
have had could be far back in time to the later event.
For instance, in Majewski, the accused began taking the intoxicants
some two days before. Though there must be considerable doubt on the
facts whether Majewski, at the time of the commission of the acts, lacked
intent or foresight, there surely must be doubt about his foresight when
182. Hall has said they are virtually non-existent: Jerome Hall, General Principles of Criminal
Law (2nd. ed. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1960) at 539. He may have been
overlooking the matter of ingestion of prescription drugs where the person lacks knowledge of
the effects - the King situation.
183. Colvin, supra, note 7 states this to be the standard of liability.
184. Colvin, supra, note 7; Dashwood, supra, note 5; Ashworth, supra, note 4; Mark T.
Thornton, "Making Sense of Majewski" (1980-81), 23 Drim LQ. 464; Barlow, supra, note 7;
Sellers, supra, note 6; Stannard, supra, note 7, all generally take this line. Either explicitly (in
the cases of Colvin, Ashworth, Thornton and Dashwood) or implicitly, the logical and
philosophical support for the theory arises from Hart, supra, note 82.
185. O'Connor, supra, note 134, at 464.
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he consumed the drugs and alcohol. This foresight extends both to
foresight of the prohibited acts and to foresight of getting into a condition
where he was not in control of his faculties.
In intoxication cases, there is a continuum of foreseeability. It begins
on the one end with the situation described by Lord Denning in
Gallagher.186 The actor intends an act but ingests alcohol or some other
drug in order to fortify her courage to do the act. By accomplishing the
act, she demonstrates that she still had the requisite intent at the time of
doing it. It is therefore not an example of either intoxication or prior fault
at all. Ordinary subjective principles would suffice to find her culpable.
If it were possible to have pre-existing mens rea and a later lack of
intention or volition, to impose culpability might be warranted as an
exception to the contemporaneity principle but that is a point I need not
consider here (nor is it conceded). If so, however, it would presumably be
justifiable on the basis that the accused did have the mens rea for the
particular offence even if at a time earlier than the act was committed.
Close to that situation would be the one, for instance, where a person
hypnotized herself or had someone else do so in order to plant a hypnotic
suggestion to do the prohibited act. Any later claim by her that the act
was involuntary or done without mens rea would be treated with
skepticism by subjectivists and objectivists alike. Using subjective
principles, she would be culpable on the basis of the mens rea at the time
of being hypnotized; thereafter, her own hypnotic actions would be the
acts of an "innocent" agent, herself.187 It is really no different from the
situation where she hypnotized some innocent third party to do the same
act or, indeed, used an innocent third party as her unwitting agent. 88
These are applications of the prior fault doctrine which are consistent
with a subjective approach to mens rea. They are not unlike the situation
in cases such as Pagan,189 Thabo Meli,190 and Bernard.191 Curiously, little
has been written about the problems with the contemporaneity principle
presented by those cases and almost none at all consider the intoxication
rules in that light. 92 Nonetheless, the cases are similiar in the sense that
186. A.G.forNorthern lreland v. Gallagher, [1963] A.C. 349, at 378-83 (H.L.).
187. Smith and Hogan, supra, note 28, at 119-20 discuss this concept. Those authors are
certainly subjectivists. See also:. v. Michael (1840), 9 C. & P.356.
188. For a useful discussion of prior fault in connection with hypnotic states and
brainwashing, see: Peter Allbridge, "Brainwashing as a Criminal Law Defence", [1984] Crim.
LR. 726.
189. Fagan v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, [1968] 3 All E.R. 442 (C.A.)
190. ThaboMeliv. The Queen, [1954] 1 All E.R. 373 (P.C.)
191. R.v.Bernard(1961), 130 C.C.C. 165 (N.B.C.A.)
192. Geoffrey Marston, "Contemporaneity of Act and Intention" (1970), 86 LQ.R. 208, for
instance, discusses continuing transactions as in the previous three notes but never mentions
intoxication as an exception to contemporaneity.
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the actor has set in motion a chain of events at a time when she had mens
rea or had mens rea at some time during the chain of events. In either
case, because subjectively she had mens rea, it was within her power to
make a conscious choice whether or not to do the act. This is arguably
a principled exception to the contemporaneity rule because there is still
subjective mens rea and it is connected with the precise act that is
criminalized.
One step down from this situation is the one where the accused knows
of her propensity for violent or criminal behavior while intoxicated yet
ingests intoxicants. Justice Dickson in Leary'93 and, in O'Connor,
Justices Stephen 94 and Aickin' 95 all considered that subjective
recklessness could be found in such a situation. It would require a finding
that the accused had foresight of the risk of committing the particular
offence charged but culpability could be found on ordinary subjective
principles. Nonetheless, even this situation would present some difficulty.
It is not implausible to imagine an accused who knows she is likely to
commit offences when intoxicated but still does not foresee the particular
act. First of all, even with the known propensity, there may not be any
great probability that, on this particular occasion, she would commit the
offence. Second, it would be unlikely that she could even foresee the risk
of any particular offence. At bottom, notwithstanding these potential
difficulties, it is possible to apply subjectivism and the prior fault doctrine
together in order to find culpability in appropriate circumstances.
Further still down the line is where the accused has generalized
knowledge of the propensity of intoxicated individuals to commit a
criminal act. The particular accused may never before have acted in such
a manner but it might be plausible to say that her general knowledge is
sufficient to constitute awareness. The first time drinker must fall into this
category. However, with the exception of criminal negligence cases,196
this sort of standard has not been applied to Canada. In this country,
positive awareness of the specific risk is required to constitute
recklessness. 97 Thus, this approach does not answer the problem that the
vast majority of sodden people do not commit criminal offences when
intoxicated or the question of foreseeability of the particular offence
charged. On a subjective test, application of the prior fault theory in these
circumstances should not be warranted.
193. Leary, supra, note 2, at 46.
194. O'Connor, supra, note 134, at 477.
195. Id, at 492-93.
196. This is an explanation advanced for such cases by Eric Colvin, "Recklessness and
Criminal Negligence" (1982), 32 U of TLJ. 345.
197. Supra, note 118.
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If that is so, what of the person who has consumed alcohol on some
previous occasions without incident but, on this occasion, has after
consuming a small or moderate amount, become pathologically
intoxicated and committed the actus reus of an offence? Such cases are
rare but known to medical science.198 In O'Connor, Chief Justice
Barwick cited the example of a diner who might not have noticed the
frequency with which the waiter topped up his glass' 99 as another
example of where the resulting state of intoxication was inadvertent. Can
it be said that these accused would have foreseen getting into such a state
or committing any offence, much less the commission of the particular
offence?
Nor is it feasible to attempt to draw a distinction based on the sort of
drug being used. This distinction was made in Hardie and by Justice
Ritchie in King but it is difficult to maintain. Drugs have rather different
effects upon different people and upon the same person on different
occasions. Much depends upon the setting and the mood of the drug user.
In addition, there is the added complication of trying to determine the
combined effects of multiple drugs. Moreover, attitudes towards drugs
vary widely. Some drugs would be considered dangerous or the taking of
them reckless by some people where others would consider such use
benign. For instance, such soft drugs as marijuana have many adherents.
It would be stretching matters to suggest that there is a consensus that
marijuana is dangerous. In the case of prescription drugs, as Hardie
demonstrates, many of these drugs are in common use but the dividing
line between proper use and misuse is not at all clear. Valium is a
commonly used drug. Why should it be treated differently from alcohol
and some other drugs? Would it be feasible to decide culpability upon an
accused's generalized knowledge of a particular substance when there is
no consensual generalized knowledge? In short, there are simply too
many variables to attempt to ascribe fault by differentiating between
types of drugs.
The present law presents another problem. It is conceivable that the
incapacity might have multiple causes.200 For instance, a person might
have received a concussive injury, taken prescription drugs, drunk
198. See eg.: Dr. Donald Blair, "The Medico-Legal Problems of Pathological Alcoholic
Intoxication: An Illustrative Case" (1969), 9 Medicine Science and the Law 94 for a
description of just such a case. The accused had consumed two double whiskeys and two single
whiskeys over a five hour period.
199. O'Connor, supra, note 134, at 456.
200. R. v. Cullum (1973), 14 C.C.C. (2d) 294 (Ont. Co.Ct.) where the automatous state was
caused by a combination of alcohol and psychological stress is an example of automatism with
more than one cause. It is unlikely that Cullum would now be acquitted in view of the decision
in Rabey.
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alcohol and been subjected to a psychological blow, all of which
contributed in some way to her resulting automatous condition. The
different tests for culpability make the law extremely perplexing. In the
example, if the primary cause of the automatons condition is the self-
induced state of intoxication, it will only be a defence if the offence is one
of specific intent.201 If the blow on the head was the primary cause, an
acquittal will lie no matter the type of offence.202 In the case of the
prescription drugs, there must be a further inquiry into whether she was
properly warned of the effects of the drugs,203 probably in isolation and
in combination with alcohol. Assuming no fault or negligence in respect
of following doctor's orders and in the circumstances of ingestion,
culpability would not lie for either a specific or general intent offence.2°4
For the psychological blow, much will depend upon the nature of the
blow, that is, whether it was a blow beyond that expected from the
ordinary stresses of life205 and, possibly, whether the actor was without
fault or negligence in exposing herself to the psychological blow.206
The legal position is therefore complicated enough so long as these
causes are distinct. In combination, they present an almost impossible
task for culpability theory to rationally handle. Is it rational to have to
consider three different defences when what is at issue is a lack of either
voluntariness or mens rea? Moreover, even if there is a way out of the
confusion, why should the law stop where it does? Why, for instance,
should there not be an inquiry into the cause of a concussive blow to
determine whether the accused was at fault in getting herself into that
situation? If she was aggressive toward another so that a fight resulted in
which she received the head injury, how is she less culpable than a person
who meekly drank alcohol for the first time in her life?
In the case of the psychological blow, if room is left in the law for an
extraordinary blow to allow the defence of automatism, is there or should
there be an inquiry into whether or not the accused contributed to the
blow by her own actions? For instance, if an accused had driven a car
recklessly or even negligently, resulting in an accident in which her child
was killed, would she be liable for any resulting criminal act committed
while in an automatons state brought on by the shock of her child's
201. R. v. Hartridge, [1967] 1 C.C.C. 346 (Sask. C.A.)
202. R. v. Minor (1955), 112 C.C.C. 29 (Sask. C.A.); Bleta v. The Queen, [1964] 1 C.C.C.
1 (s.c.c.)
203. King, supra, note 161.
204. King, id, dealt with a general intent offence.
205. Rabey, supra, note 165.
206. Id, at 260. Justice Dickson, in dissent, stated that an automatous condition would only
exculpate if the accused was without fault or negligence. It is not clear if he would apply this
to psychological blow automatism. It is also not clear if the majority would agree.
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death? This is not clear from Rabey. If such a test is not required, there
is an inconsistency in the law in requiring an absence of fault for the
ingestion of drugs but not for other forms of incapacity.
In short, the prior fault doctrine is applied in a haphazard and illogical
way. It does not cover all incapacity in the same way and it does not
apply the same standard of fault. Furthermore, it does not cover all
offences since a self-induced incapacity will still exculpate for a specific
intent offence. The argument that exculpation for specific intent offences
is warranted because some are ulterior intent offences in which there is
conduct in process rather than conduct completed,207 does not meet this
objection because of the fact that not all specific intent offences are of
ulterior intent.208 Therefore, while it is possibly a principled exception to
the contemporaneity rule to apply prior fault where the actor had the
requisite mens rea at some point in the chain of events, the other
situations on the continuum do not fall into this category.
Prior fault extends the concepts of actus reus and mens rea to
impermissible limits. With respect to the first, the inquiry into the act
extends at least to the point when the accused took the first actual step
towards incapacity and perhaps beforehand to some earlier circumstan-
ces leading towards the first step. The first-time drinker who gets drunk
on very little alcohol might be at fault, not in taking the first drink which
led to the incapacity, but in even being in the company of more
experienced drinkers, knowing that drinking was a likelihood. Insofar as
mens rea is concerned, the inquiry into it is expanded into the accused's
entire character at worst and, even at best, into her prior experience and,
likely, her general knowledge of the human condition. The law is
therefore extremely uncertain in its application, if not its meaning, and far
too complex to be effective.
The proposition that mens rea for basic or general offences is supplied
by the voluntary ingestion of intoxicating substances has been thought of
as a completely new variety of mens rea.209 This theory is bound up with
the prior fault doctrine because it involves equating the wrongfulness of
incapacitating oneself with the actual mens rea required for a general
intent offence.210 It is, however, a throwback to the older view of mens
rea held to in Prince2l1 and by Stroud212 in which the mental attitude of
207. Colvin, supra, note 7, at 759 and 779.
208. E.g.: Murder, possession of stolen property. See previous discussion in Section B.
209. Dashwood, supra, note 5, at 538; Stannard, supra, note 7, at 299-300; Sellers, supra,
note 6, at 257-60.
210. Sellers, id., at 257, especially in note 76, makes this point.
211. Pr'nce, supra, note 152.
212. Stroud, supra, note 148, at 15.
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the actor is not referrable to the eventual prohibited act. Instead of
requiring proof that the accused adverted to the particular act, all that is
required is that the accused be shown to have known that her act was
illegal or morally wrong.213 In other words, the accused may never have
meant to do the criminal act even though, beforehand, she may have
known that it was illegal or immoral. Note how close this is to the second
branch of the Hartian test 214 for there is a need to inquire into the ability
of the accused to assess the illegality or immorality of her act. It is, in
other words, simply a test of the capacity of the accused to conform to the
law, rather than an inquiry into her actual state of mind.
This test, in effect, equates morality with intent. Thus, one who is
"immoral" in consuming an intoxicating substance is deemed to have the
requisite intent. As Stannard rightly pointed out, this "new" form of mens
rea is no mens rea at all.215 The end result is a new form of mens rea
which is deemed rather than existing, and a virtual requirement that an
accused demonstrate good character, that is, that she knew what was
moral and legal and attempted to comply with those standards. All of this
is "in the air"216 in the sense that it is not connected with the eventual act
in any direct way. That is to say, the operating mind of the accused is not
in any way connected with the doing of the act.
The danger of this was highlighted by Justice Murphy in O'Connor:
If Majewski were followed, so that intoxication could be used to establish
guilt in the absence of intent, evidence of intoxication must be admissible
and available. Indeed, one would expect the prosecution to lead the
evidence, otherwise it may be left with an acquittal based on no intent
(because that is the fact) and no intoxication because evidence of it was
not introduced.
217
In Starrat,218 a police officer was acquitted of assaulting a person
because he was able to shed doubt that it was his intention to apply force
when he swung his handcuffs. But, if a drunken person were charged with
the same act, Justice Murphy's concern could become reality. Evidence
of intoxication would effectively prevent the accused from arguing that
the Crown had not proven the requisite intent. This, I submit, is
unacceptably unfair to an accused.
213. Stannard, supra, note 7, at 297.
214. Hart, supra, note 173.
215. Stannard, supra, note 7, at 300.
216. Leary, supra, note 2, at 46.
217. O'Connor, supra, note 134, at 485. This, in fact, occurred in R. v. Fahey and Lindsay
(1978), S.A.S.R. 577. For a discussion see: Matthew Goode, "Some Thoughts on the present
state of the "Defence" of Intoxication" (1984), 8 Crim. L. 104, especially at 111.
218. Starralt, supra, note 124.
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The alternative would be to do as pointed out by Justice Dickson in
Lear:219 ask the judge or jury to ignore the evidence of intoxication and
attempt to assess the state of the mind absent that factor. This is, of
course, a complete fiction and one almost impossible to apply in practice.
This approach would, in fact, ignore the "fault" of becoming intoxicated,
presumably because it is "fault", and hence does not even use the prior
fault doctrine except as a way of excluding evidence.
To summarize, the prior fault doctrine constitutes a violation of the
rule of contemporaneity. That, in itself, might be defensible, provided that
it is done in a principled, consistent way. Prior fault as it is usually applied
in cases of self-induced intoxication or of automatism through some fault
of the accused does not meet these requirements. The result is a
disjointed, incoherent approach to criminal culpability.
IV. Deterrence
The previous discussion leads naturally into further examination of the
broader aims of the criminal law and whether these are met by the
present intoxication rules. One of the principal aims of criminal law is to
deter certain types of conduct.220 The deterrence argument, in relation to
the debate about the intoxication defence, is a bridge between strict logic
and policy. On the one hand, the theory of deterrence has behind it
certain logical premises, the chief one being the ability to choose to act.
On the other hand, there are other aims sought to be achieved by the
criminal law - retribution, rehabilitation and protection of the public
being among them. Thus, to the extent that these aims may contradict
one another, and in the weight accorded each in arranging the criminal
law, policy prevails.
The deterrent aim of the criminal law is founded on the premise that
individuals can choose whether to act or not. This section is not meant to
stray into a discussion of free will versus determinism or, indeed, any
broad philosophical debate about the merits or demerits of deterrence as
a goal. It is, however, meant to deal with the argument which might be
advanced that the present intoxication rules have, or are capable of
having, the effect of deterring the commission of general or basic intent
offences.
At the outset, a distinction must be drawn between the two types of
deterrence, individual (or specific) and public (or general). The former
seeks to inhibit the particular individual from repeating the prohibited
conduct. The latter is directed more generally at society. By punishing the
219. Leary, supra, note 2, at 41-42.
220. N. Morris, "Impediments to Legal Reform" (1966), 33 U. Chi L Rev. 627, at 631.
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particular individual for a certain type of conduct, it is hoped that other
persons will be deterred from acting in that way. The discussion
immediately following deals first with specific deterrence.
It is important at the outset to distinguish what is sought to be deterred
by the present intoxication rules. Since, by definition, there is a lack of the
requisite mental element at the time of the commission of a general intent
offence (the intoxication rules would not otherwise be at issue), it would
seem obvious that the criminal law does not really seek to prevent the
commission of the actual offence. This point has been made by Justice
Dickson in Learyja' and by Justice Stephen in O'Connor.222 In other
words, the fact of intoxication to the extent of lacking the requisite mens
rea militates heavily against that person being deterred from committing
the offence. The only exceptions might be the situation outlined in
Gallagher (intoxication superimposed on pre-existing mens rea) or
where the accused has previously demonstrated a known propensity for
criminal behavior while intoxicated.
As a result, any deterrent effect of the present law must relate to
deterring that degree of intoxication or, perhaps, intoxication in
general.224 This at once presents difficulty. First of all, there is no good
reason why deterrence should not be attempted for specific intent
offences as well. Since, by means of the prior fault doctrine, we are
dealing with attributed intent, why not attribute specific (or ulterior)
intent as well?
The concept of deterrence is based in large part on the certainty of the
law and of punishment for wrongful conduct- 5 Since intoxication is
what is punished in respect of a general intent offence and since
intoxication is not otherwise an offence, the certainty principle is violated
by the present intoxication rules.
The second branch of certainty, that of punishment, is also not
achieved by the present rules. Only where the intoxication has led
ultimately to the commission of a general intent offence is the actor liable
to be punished. Other episodes of extreme intoxication where an actus
reus was not committed do not give rise to punishment. These difficulties
must have contributed to Justice Dickson's description of the present law
221. Leary, supra, note 2, at 45.
222. O'Connor, supra, note 134, at 477.
223. Gallagher, supra, note 186.
224. Though this broader goal would be open to the objection that Parliament ought simply
to make intoxication simpliciter an offence.
225. C. Beccaria, "On Crimes and Punishments" in Theories of Punishment, S. E. Grupp,
(Bloomington, Indiana: University Press, 1971) at 122. Although Beccaria's theory of
deterrence has been greatly modified since the 18th century when he devised it, it is submitted
that certainty of the law and of punishment are still prerequisites of effective deterrence.
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as "both uncertain and inconstant. '226 This renders any attempt at
specific deterrence a dismal failure.
Hart's criticism of Jeremy Bentham was that, while specific deterrence
cannot be effective in such circumstances, nonetheless there can be
effective general deterrence because normal people will become more
careful. 227 There is a gross contradiction of principle involved here. Our
criminal law system is founded upon the tenet that an accused has the
ability to choose to act or not. Even those propounding negligence as
culpable acknowledge this. 228 Yet, negligence, by definition, is
inadvertence, hence, is not a condition voluntarily produced.2
29 It
therefore is a negation of choice.
The counter-argument is that people can and do choose whether to
take care. But take the situation where a person negligently knocks a vase
from a table, causing it to break. Would punishing such negligence
necessarily lead to any greater care? If the passage of such a law did have
that effect, then it would have caused the careful person to have adverted
to the risk. Then any resulting damage is reckless rather than negligent
damage. On the other hand, if passing such a law did not make the
person more careful, it would not have been successful in its aim. It has
not been demonstrated why it is thought that a negligent person could
have been careful.230 If the counter-argument is that the negligence
standard in tort law has or can have a deterrent effect, the rejoinder is that
a comparison with tort law is not valid since different considerations
apply. While deterrence may be a factor in tort liability, the overriding
concern is to compensate the victim of a tort. Criminal law has no such
paramount concern.
Indeed, the efficacy of the criminal law would be jeopardized if the
threshold of culpability were lowered so as to generally encompass
negligence. Criminal offences are largely those which the majority of the
population consider morally as well as legally wrong. In contrast, most
strict and absolute liability offences, while meant to protect the public
welfare, are usually considered to be legal wrongs but with little or no
moral stigma attached to their commission. (There is bound to be some
226. Leary, supra, note 2, at 47.
227. Hart, supra, note 82, at 19. Jeremy Bentham, one of the early propounders of deterrent
theory, thought that the criminal law could not hope to deter offenders who were insane,
children, intoxicated, under duress or operating out of necessity. Hart accepted this point but
maintained that there could still be a general deterrent effect.
228. Hart, id., at 154, for example, implicitly recognizes that choice is involved in the taking
of reasonable precautions.
229. Jerome Hall, supra, note 175, at 253, eL seq. suggests that to find negligence as a
voluntarily produced condition would involve inquiry into the actor's entire past history.
230. Id., at 262.
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disagreement with this latter statement, particularly for offences such as
pollution offences; nevertheless, in general, it seems fair to say that there
is greater moral stigma attached to true criminal offences than to most
public welfare offences.) If we punished for the negligent commission of
criminal acts, we would run the risk of reducing or removing this moral
stigma, thus lessening the deterrent effect of the law. As well, punishing
inadvertence could lead to a general disrespect for the law because of its
resulting unfairness. Again, this could result in the disintegration of the
deterrent effect of the criminal law. The long and the short of it is that the
criminal law and its concommitant severe penalties must be reserved for
the most severe transgressions against societal values. The most serious
conduct is advertent conduct. Hart has suggested that the individual has
some claim to security and well-being against society's right to punish for
a breach of the law.231 Surely that claim is best protected by punishing
only for the highest degrees of culpability - intention and recklessness.
There is nevertheless some validity to Hart's claim for deterrence but
it is dependent, at least in part, upon public knowledge that engaging in
a particular sort of activity might lead to punishment. In other words, the
law (and punishment flowing out of penal prohibitions), to act as a
deterrent must have a moralizing and educative effect upon the
populace. 232 But, if intoxication is not normally punishable, either as an
offence itself or as a culpable state of mind, it is difficult to see how the
public can develop an attitude against intoxication. Only if intoxication
supplied the requisite mens rea for any offence, whether general or
specific intent, could there be any chance of deterrence being
accomplished. Hart himself has elsewhere stated:
... there is very little evidence to support the idea that morality is best
taught by fear of legal punishment.233
After all, what we are really talking about with the intoxication rules
is the instilling in the public mind of a moral stance against intoxication.
This is not to denigrate the notion of public deterrence or even Hart's
conception of it. It is instead to illustrate the impossibility of achieving
231. Hart, supra, note 82, at 21-22.
232. G. Hawkins, "Punishment and Deterrence: The Educative, Moralizing and Habituative
Effects" (1969), 2 Wisc, L Rev. 550. A practical illustration might be the various offences
under our Criminal Code prohibiting drinking and driving. Though the prohibitions have been
in effect for some years, it has taken the passage of time for deterrence of such conduct even
to begin to take place. Arguably, what deterrent effect now being achieved can be attributed,
in part, to the moralizing and educative process that has occurred.
233. H. L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (London: Oxford University Press, 1963) at 58.
The passage deals with fear of punishment which is one of the premises upon which the
deterrent aim is based.
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deterrence of intoxicated conduct through the mechanism of the specific
and general intent dichotomy.
It might be arguable to try to accomplish deterrence by refusing
intoxication as a defence altogether. There are, however, other
compelling reasons why this should not be done. In the first place, it
would be open to the same charge of uncertainty since the deterrence
would still be directed against intoxication rather the offence itself. More
important, it would constitute a gross exception to the subjective
approach to mens rea that our criminal law system has, in most other
respects, adopted. The same arguments mounted earlier would apply -
inconsistency, violations of contemporaneity, etc. It would, however, be
more consistent than under the present dichotomy.
I will, in the last section of this article, give reasons why we ought to
advance towards a more subjective approach in cases of intoxication. At
this time, let it be noted that there is merit in seeking to deter the
commission of offences while intoxicated. What is at issue is whether the
present restrictions on the intoxication defence have or are capable of
having that effect. Since there is considerable doubt as to the efficacy of
deterrence as a justifying aim of the criminal law,234 it is necessary to
employ means that maximize the chances of deterrence being
accomplished. This, I submit, is not achieved under the present law.
V. Policy
At the beginning, I mentioned that the arguments in favour of the present
law were founded on the twin heads of logic and policy. Deterrence has
been seen as the connecting link between these two. In addition, different
reasons have been advanced for penalizing certain types of conduct.
Aside from attempting to deter such behaviour, other reasons include
protection of the public from intoxicated offenders, retribution against
them, the establishment and maintenance of order and the preservation of
individual liberties by protecting them from attack by such offenders. I do
not propose to debate whether these are valid policy goals. What will be
examined is whether the present law does meet or is capable of meeting
those goals.
Perhaps the most intellectually honest judgment in Majewski was that
of Lord Salmon.235 He stated his position quite succinctly:
... I accept that there is a degree of illogicality in the rule that intoxication
may excuse or expunge one type of intention and not another. This
234. Hart, supra, note 82, uses the term 'Justifying aim".
235. Majewski, supra, note 3, at 155-59. Gold, supra, note 6, at 65, describes it as the most
honest judgment. Martin, J. A. in Moreau, supra, note 4, at 230, et seq., seems to ascribe to
this view in holding that the specific-general intent dichotomy is based on policy.
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illogicality is, however, acceptable to me because the benevolent part of
the rule removes undue harshness without imperilling safety and the
stricter part of the rule works without imperilling justice. It would be just
as ridiculous to remove the benevolent part of the rule (which no one
suggests) as it would be to adopt the alternative of removing the stricter
part of the rule for the sake of preserving absolute logic. Absolute logic in
human affairs is an uncertain guide and a very dangerous master. The law
is primarily concerned with human affairs. I believe that the main object
of our legal system is to preserve individual liberty. One important aspect
of individual liberty is protection against physical violence.s 6
The context suggests that what worried Lord Salmon the most was the
thought of a person like Lipman23 7 going scot-free should the law be
completely logical.
There is, of course, legitimate concern that an automatous killer will be
let loose if ordinary subjective principles are applied. However, despite
the prevalence of intoxicated conduct, the intoxication defence is seldom
raised and is even less often successful. This statement, it must be
admitted, is based largely upon anecdotal evidence rather than hard data.
Little data, unfortunately, exist to show the frequency with which the
defence is advanced or is successful. In one study, however, the
conclusion was that the defence was argued in only 11 out of 510 cases
and was clearly successful in just one case.238
The available anecdotal evidence also suggests that the fear of
dangerous persons being let loose is greatly exaggerated. The worst fears
of O'Connor have not materialized:
... the decision in O'Connor's case, far from opening any floodgates has
at most permitted an occasional drip to escape from the tap.239
Judges at both the Full Court of Victoria level240 and the High Court241
in the O'Connor case made this point. Their views ought to carry
considerable weight because they drew on the long experience in the
State of Victoria where intent had not been separated into the specific and
general categories for many years. 242 There was nothing to suggest that
236. Id., at 158.
237. In R. v. Lipman, [1970] 1 Q.B. 152, the accused was found guilty of manslaughter on the
application of the present intoxication rules. He had arguably acted involuntarily and without
mens rea when he caused the death of a woman after ingesting LSD. He was under the illusion
that he was fighting off snakes. His condition provided a defence to the specific intent offence,
murder, but not to the general intent offence, manslaughter.
238. Judge George Smith, "Footnote to O'Connor's Case", 11981] 5 Crfim. L.J 270, at 276-
77. One should be hesitant, of course, to rely too much on such statistics which are based on
an admittedly small sample.
239. Id., at 277.
240. R. v. O'Connor, [1980] V.R. 635,per Starke, J., at 647 and,per Gray, J., at 651.
241. O'Connor, supra, note 134, per Barwick, C. J., at 460, and, per Stephen, J., at 474-75.
242. The specific-general intent distinction had been ignored in Victoria since well before
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the state of the law in Victoria had contributed to any outbreak of
intoxicated crime or increased danger to the public.
Much of the fear can be attributed to a misunderstanding of what the
intoxication defence is all about. It clearly only comes into play when
there is a doubt about the requisite intent or voluntariness. Yet, judges
and likely the public persist in the concern that intoxication alone will
suffice to provide a defence. From that position, it is then reasoned that
steps must be taken to limit the defence. This very thing happened in
Majewski. It would be most plausible to conclude, on the facts, that
Majewski was able to and did form the intent to do his acts. He did, after
all, seem to act in a purposeful intentional way. Therefore, ordinary
subjective principles should have been sufficient to convict him.243
In addition, there seems to be, on the part of appeal judges, a fear that
juries will too readily accept a spurious defence of intoxication. Lord
Elwyn-Jones, in Majewski, demonstrated this fear:
... I do not think that it is enough to say ... that we can rely on the good
sense of the jury or of magistrates to ensure that the guilty are convicted.244
Yet, as had been pointed out,245 our legal system relies upon juries (and
judges and magistrates, sometimes even lay magistrates) to decide all
manner of difficult questions. There is absolutely no reason why we
should single out intoxication as being too difficult for such people to
decide. Indeed, this is all the more so when, as has been so aptly stated:
The inferences to be drawn from intoxication are not all one way:
evidence of intoxication may result in absence of proof beyond reasonable
doubt of mens rea, or in a more ready acceptance that mens rea exists on
the supposition that intoxication reduces inhibitions.246
It is, in short, a misplaced and perhaps elitist concern that the triers of
fact will not be able to distinguish the meritorious defence from the
spurious. Moreover, the potential malingerer puts herself at a
disadvantage because recollection of any of the events might adversely
affect her credibility while an inability to recall means she cannot
1964 when R. v. Keogh, [1964] V.R. 400 (S.C. Vict.) was decided. See also: R. v. Haywood,
[1971] V.R. 755 (S.C. Vict.)
243. Glanville Williams, supra, note 6, at 658, argues, convincingly, that the House of Lords
could simply have dismissed Majewski's appeal by holding that the trial judge was in error not
to put intoxication to the jury but applying the proviso on the basis that there 'nas no
miscarriage ofjustice. Orchard, supra, note 6, at 137, makes the same point.
244. Majewski, supra, note 3, at 151.
245. Orchard, supra, note 6, at 137; Beck and Parker, supra, note 88, at 607; Glanville
Williams, Criminal Law The General Part (2nd. ed. London: Stevens & Sons Limited. 1961)
at 565.
246. O'Connor, supra, note 134, at 485.
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challenge the evidence against her.247 Finally, even in a case of genuine
intoxication to the point of negating the mental element, an accused
might have partial recall of the events, yet not be malingering;24 such a
person runs the grave risk of being disbelieved simply because she
remembers some of the events. Thus, the cards are stacked against the
successful intoxication defence.
The twin fears that someone will go unpunished for having committed
a criminal offence and that juries will be manipulated by unscrupulous
defendants are, in themselves, over-emphasized. It is true that the rare
case like Lipman illustrates some potential danger to the public but the
infrequency of such cases is sufficient to make the point.249 At other
points in our criminal justice system, we are willing to risk freeing guilty
people in favour of protecting civil liberties and in fairness to accused
persons. Why should we not take that risk in connection with the
intoxication defence, especially when the risk is minute? Moreover,
... a lack of confidence in the ability of a tribunal correctly to estimate
evidence of states of mind and the like can never be sufficient ground for
excluding from inquiry the most fundamental element in a rational and
human criminal code.250
Even accepting that it is good policy to attempt to protect the public
by restricting the intoxication defence, there are some serious objections
to the present law. First, why should the law not protect the public from
the commission of specific intent offences by intoxicated persons? 25'
Furthermore, if retribution is an end to be sought, there is arguably a
greater need to punish those committing specific intent offences while
intoxicated since such offences are, generally speaking, more serious than
are general intent offences: murder is more serious than manslaughter,
attempted murder more serious than assault.
At the beginning of this article, I indicated the discussion would
proceed on the footing that mistakes are accorded the same treatment as
simple intoxication, that is, a drunken mistake would provide no defence
to a general intent crime. But, if an argument can be made that mistakes
induced by or bound up with intoxication might still be a defence to a
247. Schabas, supra, note 6, at 153.
248. Kenneth G. Gray, "Alcoholic Amnesia" (1958-59) 1 Crim. L.Q. 483, at 484. Gray was
both a lawyer and a psychiatrist. This opinion was based on clinical experiments.
249. 1 must confess to having acted as counsel on such a case myself. The accused was
acquitted of murder but convicted of manslaughter. I am convinced that it was a true case of
automatism caused by intoxication. Even in Lipman, ajury might well have concluded that the
accused had at least minimal awareness of what he did inasmuch as he fled the country.
250. Thomas v. P. (1937), 59 C.L.R. 279, at 309 (Aust. H.C.), per Dixon, J.
251. A point made by Barwick, C. J. in O'Connor, supra, note 134, at 465.
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general intent offence,252 there is a further damning blow to the present
intoxication rules. Such a position, if it has some plausibility, represents
a striking inconsistency in both logic and policy. It should be apparent
that a complete lack of intent is likely closer to an incapacity to form
intent, that is, probably akin to automatism, while a drunken mistake
might have resulted from a much lesser degree of intoxication. There
would seem to be more danger to the public from a person so intoxicated
as not to be in conscious control of her limbs than from one able to
exercise some cognition, albeit impaired. Yet, there is at least doubt that
the law treats the threat as a more serious one.
Finally, it can be argued that the specific-general intent dichotomy has
been a delaying action by the judiciary. In other words, judges have
devised the dichotomy largely because of the policy influence that
intoxication could be equated with moral blameworthiness and, hence,
mens rea.253 Had they not done so, it is quite conceivable that legislatures
would have filled any resulting vacuum with appropriate legislation.
Usurping the legislative function has therefore had the double effect of
"adoption of a legal fiction which cuts across fundamental criminal law
precepts" 2 4 and of delaying consideration by legislatures of the problem
represented by persons who, acting involuntarily or without mens rea,
may nonetheless represent a danger to the public.
VI. Conclusion
There is, in the result, a minor tragedy for criminal culpability theory.
The specific and general intent division is fraught with inconsistencies
and is illogical. It does not meet these charges with any policy
considerations other than those based on emotive responses. The law
could have gone another way as it has in Australia for some years
without serious incident. To apply subjective principles would not
necessarily result in anarchy and disrespect for the criminal law. It is
undeniably true that an automatous homicide should not go unchecked,
unpunished or untreated. But it can be done in another way - through
the passage of appropriate legislation to deal with dangerous intoxication
or other incapacity. That is a topic I shall deal with in a later article.
However, let me conclude with a short recitation of the advantages of
a subjectivist approach. First, it has the advantage of limiting the scope of
the criminal law to situations where the actor was sufficiently culpable.
Intention and recklessness are acceptable states of culpability for
252. Supra, note 4 and surrounding text.
253. Goode, supra, note 217, at 110.
254. Leary, supra, note 2, at 47, per Dickson, J.
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criminality. Negligence is not, because it is both unfair and non-
utilitarian.255 It may have its place in tort law, where the concern is to
compensate the victim of the tortious act. It may be justifiable for strict
liability offences since these are matters of public welfare but are not
criminal in the real sense of being morally repugnant to most people.
Negligence may even, in a very limited way, be justified for certain types
of criminal offences where the activity is dangerous to the public but may
take place without conscious thought because of its repetitive nature.256
Certain driving offences might fall into this category but, even there, if
that were to happen, the level of punishment would have to be lowered
to compensate for the lesser culpability. But negligence has no place
generally in the criminal law and certainly not, where intoxication is
concerned, as an exceptional state of culpability not related at all to the
prohibited act.
Second, while there are apt always to be problems in determining the
state of mind of an accused person, the subjective approach is by far the
simplest. Those who think that it would be easier to find the state of mind
of a mythical reasonable person or even of the actual accused absent the
factor of intoxication are only deluding themselves.
If one of the purposes of the criminal law is to attempt to deter crime,
the chances of doing so are maximized when the law is simple, certain
and known to the public. That the present intoxication rules can satisfy
any of these criteria is unlikely. When lawyers and judges are basically
reduced to memorizing lists of those offences which have been
categorized, the law is not simple. When it is only discovered that an
offence is of either category once it has been so detern3ined judicially, the
law is not known. When some offences can be slotted into either
category z27 the law is not certain.
This is not to suggest that subjectivism has all the answers. Principled
exceptions to contemporaneity, for example, may have their place. But
this should be where the actor did possess the requisite mens rea at some
time during the course of the events in question.218 It should not be used
to impose a type of mens rea that is incompatible with the more generally
accepted form. If the criminal law is to have a theory of mens rea, it must
255. See note 227 and surrounding text.
256. Stuart, supra, note 89, at 194-95, makes this concession to a negligent standard,
257. Until Leary, rape was a specific intent offence in Ontario (R. v. Vandervoort (1961), 34
C.R. 380 (Ont. C.A.)) but a general intent offence in British Columbia (Boucher, supra, note
44); mischief was categorized as a specific intent offence (R. v. Piche (1967), 10 Crim. L.Q.
107 (Ont. Mag. Ct.)) until recategorized as a general intent offence in R. v. Butler (1984), 42
C.R. (3d) 268 (Ont. Co. Ct.) and Schmidtke, supra, note 119.
258. As, for instance, in Fagan, supra, note 189; Thabo Meli, supra, note 190; and Bernard,
supra, note 191.
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be one that is consistently applied. It is simply not appropriate to have a
mixture of mens rea theories.
It must be conceded that the subjective approach also does not have a
way of protecting the public from or deterring dangerous intoxication.
That is where a dangerous intoxication offence is required. On balance,
however, the subjective determination of voluntariness and mens rea
best, though imperfectly, achieves most of the ends sought to be achieved.
There is another advantage in restoring subjective principles. It might
assist the criminal law in getting away from the absurd compartmental-
ization of defences that seems presently to pervade it. There is no sound
reason, for example, to slot defences into the categories of intoxication or
mistake - each is a denial of mens rea. Likewise, automatism is a denial
of voluntariness. If the law were to rid itself of the prior fault doctrine
and, instead, simply determine whether or not the act in question was
done consciously and voluntarily, it can easily be seen that automatism
and intoxication would be indistinguishable as defences where
voluntariness was in doubt.
Insanity, that is to say, diseases of the mind, could also be considered
on the questions of mens rea and voluntariness. This would leave aside
the larger question of responsibility on the part of one suffering from such
a disease. But this approach would have the advantage of determining, in
fact, whether that person acted voluntarily and with mens rea. In
addition, in combination with the passage of legislation dealing with
other incapacitated offenders, it would assist in removing the rigid lines
separating automatism, insanity and intoxication.
A purely subjective approach would do away with the confusion, in
intoxication cases, between the issue of capacity to form intent and actual
intent. The actual state of mind of the accused would be the sole issue259
In this respect, the issue of capacity to form intent would still, of course,
be important in determining voluntariness. But it would result in a
simpler test for the mental element, rather than, as is often the case now,
having a test of capacity and then, once capacity is proven, deciding the
issue of actual intent. Again, the result would be greater simplicity and
certainty in the law.
259. This position is still not entirely clear in Canada. Some cases, for instance, R. v. Dees
(1978), 40 C.C.C. (2d) 58 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Otis (1978), 39 C.C.C. (2d) 304 (Ont. C.A.); R.
v. Sequin (1979), 45 C.C.C. (2d) 498 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Knuff(1980), 52 C.C.C. (2d) 523
(Alta. C.A.); R v. Murphy (1981), 58 C.C.C. (2d) 338 (N.S.C.A.) and R v. Vasil (1981), 58
C.C.C. (2d) 97, at 117 (S.C.C.) have said the actual intent is what is to be determined.
However, Leary, supra, note 2, Swietlinski, supra, note 10, 1. v. Mulligan (1974), 18 C.C.C.
(2d) 270, at 277-78 (Ont. C.A.) affd 28 C.C.C. (2d) 129, at 139 (S.C.C.) and Young v. The
Queen (1981), 59 C.C.C. (2d) 305 (S.C.C.) all contain contrary language. One can only
conclude that there is still doubt on the point.
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What would then be required would be some way for the criminal law
to protect the public, sometimes to treat the "offender", and, if possible,
to deter people from getting themselves into potentially dangerous
conditions. This could be better accomplished by legislation.
The subjective approach is not a panacea. But it would enhance the
criminal law by streamlining it considerably. Its adoption would also
afford an opportunity for the criminal justice system to assess the need for
a dangerous intoxication offence. That is not, however, to suggest that
consideration should not be given now to such an offence in order to
meet both real and perceived concerns. It is simply to suggest that, if the
Australian experience is indicative, the scope for such an offence will be
very small.
